MAURICE COX, APPELLANT,
v.
RACQUIA DEACON, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed a permanent domestic violence injunction, rejecting the appellant's claims that he lacked notice and that the injunction exceeded statutory duration limits.
A permanent injunction for protection against domestic violence under Fla. Stat. § 741.30 may remain in effect indefinitely until modified or dissolved, and the trial court properly denied the appellant's motion to dissolve where he received notice and an opportunity to be heard.
[1] A permanent injunction for protection against domestic violence under Fla. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaurice Cox sought to dissolve a final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic violence issued against him by Racquia Deacon. Cox claim…
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We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dissolve a final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic violence. He claims that he did not have notice and opportunity to be heard on the motion, but the record belies this contention. He was given notice of the final hearing, and he was handed a copy of the final judgment in court, for which he signed a receipt.1 Additionally, appellant argues that the permanent injunction entered pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes, was improper because it was for a period of more than a year. Although at one time there was a statutory provision that limited permanent injunctions to a period of one year, that provision was removed by the legislature in 1997. The current statute as amended provides for an injunction to “remain in effect until modified or dissolved.” § 741.30(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Miguez v. Miguez, 824 So.2d 258 (Fla. 3d *828DCA 2002). The court did not err in refusing to dissolve the injunction.
Affirmed.
WARNER, TAYLOR and MAY, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Mohamed Shaheed Bacchus v. Heba Bacchus, 108 So. 3d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…of becoming the victim of domestic violence ....”§ 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). The statute authorizing issuance of such an injunction contemplates that the injunction will last indefinitely, [*714] unless modified or dissolved.1 Cox v. Deacon, 82 So. 3d 827, 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The statute states: The terms of an injunction restraining the respondent under subparagraph (a)l. or ordering other relief under sub-paragraph (a)7. shall remain in effect until modified or dissolved. Either party may mov…
Authorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Miguez v. Maryanka Miguez, 824 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)