BAMBI L. ULANDER, APPELLANT,
v.
BRETT N. ULANDER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this family law appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's decision that reduced a former husband's past due child support arrearage by one-half upon modification of custody. The court held that vested support obligations cannot be reduced without extraordinary circumstances, and remanded for full arrearage recovery plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
A trial court may not reduce child support obligations that have already accrued without finding extraordinary or compelling circumstances. The trial court erred in reducing the arrearage by one-half based solely on the custody modification. The trial court also erred in failing to award pre- and post-judgment interest on the arrearage.
[1] Past due child support payments become vested rights of the payee at the time they are due and cannot be reduced absent a finding of extraordinary or compelling circumsta…
[2] A trial court errs in reducing a child support arrearage by one-half solely because the custodial parent's circumstances have changed regarding the number of children in…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The support obligations of the former husband under the separation agreement that was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution of marriage became the vested rights of the payee at the time the payments were due.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that support obligations create vested rights when due, which cannot be arbitrarily reduced.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties entered into a separation agreement in 1990 that included child support provisions, incorporated into a final dissolution judgment. In 200…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Petition For Modification Of Child Support cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of an order modifying a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Because the trial court erred in reducing the amount of past due child support by one-half, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to award the entire arrearage to the former wife. The amount should also be corrected to reflect any credit that the trial court determines is due the former husband as a result of overpayments.
In 1990, the parties entered into a separation agreement that included provisions for child support.
On July 25, 1990, the trial court rendered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated the separation agreement.
On April 27, 2000, the former husband filed a petition seeking to modify the judgment to obtain custody of one of the two minor children and to modify child support as a result. The former wife counter-petitioned, contending that under the terms of the separation agreement, the former husband owed past due child support. The parties subsequently agreed that the minor son would reside with the former husband and that the support obligation would be modified accordingly from that point forward. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the former wife’s counter-petition for past due support. The court determined that only one-half of the arrearage would be awarded to the former wife, however, because she would now have custody of only one of the two children. This was error. The support obligations of the former husband under the separation agreement that was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution of marriage became the vested rights of the payee at the time the payments were due. See Livingston v. Livingston, 686 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Ashe v. Ashe, 509 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
A reduction in child support that is already owed may not be made absent a finding of extraordinary or compelling circumstances. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fisher, 738 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Here, the trial court did not make a finding of extraordinary or compelling circumstances before reducing the arrearage by one-half.
In addition, the trial court erred in failing to award to the former wife pre and post judgment interest on the arrearage. See Romans v. Romans, 611 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Applegate v. Applegate, 566 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). On remand, the court should determine the appropriate amount of interest. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.
DAVIS, PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Conway v. Conway, 111 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…ning to award any prejudgment interest. The fact that the trial court awarded the Former Wife an amount she was owed from the Former Husband’s bonuses indicates that she had a right to the amounts she was underpaid each year. See Ulander v. Ulander, 824 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (where we reversed a trial court’s failure to award prejudgment interest on a former husband’s support arrear-age, stating that a support obligation enshrined in a final judgment dissolution of marriage becomes a vested righ…
Authorities Cited
- Ashe v. Ashe, 509 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Applegate v. Applegate, 566 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Romans v. Romans, 611 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Cnty. OF Sarasota v. Zacker, 686 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Watson v. Pepper, 738 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- State v. Fisher, 738 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)