REINALDO M. RUBIO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Reinaldo Rubio appeals the revocation of his probation, challenging whether he was responsible for his discharge from a court-ordered drug rehabilitation program. The appellate court reversed the revocation because Rubio's dismissal from the program was precipitated by an arrest for threatening his girlfriend—a charge the trial court itself determined to be invalid—and therefore Rubio could not be held responsible for the program failure.
The court held that Rubio could not be held responsible for his discharge from Phoenix House because his dismissal was caused by his arrest for the threat allegation, which the trial court determined to be invalid. Accordingly, the revocation was reversed and the case remanded for reinstatement of the original sentence.
[1] A trial court's revocation of probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
[2] For a probation violation based on failure to complete a substance abuse program, the failure must be shown to be the probationer's fault to be considered willful.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a defendant's probation is sought to be revoked because of his failure to successfully complete a designated rehabilitation program, some evidence must be submitted to show that the defendant was in some manner responsible for such failure.”
Establishes the legal standard that a probationer must be responsible for program failure, not merely fail to complete it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRubio was placed on five years' probation with standard conditions plus a special condition to successfully complete the Phoenix House drug and alcoho…
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PER CURIAM.
Reinaldo Rubio appeals the revocation of his probation and the judgment and sentence imposed after revocation.
Rubio was originally placed on five years probation with the imposition of standard probation conditions and the special condition that he enter and successfully complete the Phoenix House drug and alcohol rehabilitation program. While on probation Rubio’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that Rubio had violated the condition of his probation by threatening to kill his girlfriend. On the same day of his arrest, he was discharged from the Phoenix House because he did not successfully complete the program. The probation officer then amended his affidavit to include the allegation that Rubio had also violated the condition of his probation which required him to successfully complete the Phoenix House program.
At the probation violation hearing, the probation officer testified that the Phoenix House rules prohibit alcohol consumption by its residents and that Rubio had admitted that he violated the rule in his presence and that of the director of Phoenix House. They decided that Rubio would not be discharged from Phoenix House because of his honesty.
The director also testified at the hearing and stated that Rubio was discharged not only for being arrested but for a culmination of violations. She said that in addition to consuming alcohol, he had also once improperly left the county and smoked cigarettes. She admitted on cross-examination that it was, however, the arrest based upon the initial affidavit which ultimately led to Rubio’s dismissal. Rubio’s girlfriend, testified only that they had argued and made no mention of threats.
The trial court concluded that Rubio had not violated probation by committing another crime, but because he was discharged from Phoenix House before completing the program, the court revoked probation and imposed the judgement and sentence now appealed.
A trial court’s revocation of probation is reviewed under the standard of an abuse of discretion. See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). However, there must be evidence in the record to support a finding that any violation was willful and substantial. See id. In the context of failure to complete a substance abuse program, the failure is a willful violation if the failure can be shown to be the fault of the probationer. See Rainer v. State, 657 So. 2d 1230, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In Curry v. State, 379 So. 2d 140, 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), the court stated the analysis in a slightly different manner: “When a defendant’s probation is sought to be revoked because of his failure to successfully complete a designated rehabilitation program, some evidence must be submitted to show that the defendant was in some manner responsible for such failure.”
It was the trial court’s duty at the revocation hearing to determine whether Rubio was at fault for his dismissal or whether he was “in some manner responsible” for his dismissal. The trial courts comments at the hearing suggest that Ru-bio’s consumption of alcohol was also an issue, but the State concedes in its brief that the revocation was only because of his dismissal from Phoenix House. It is clear that Rubio was discharged from Phoenix House because he was arrested for probation violation. The director testified that there were other violations by Rubio which could have supported discharge and the arrest was the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.” But, Rubio was not discharged for those other violations. In fact, Rubio was specifically not discharged for alcohol consumption due to his honesty and other good behavior. He was discharged because he was arrested for probation violation based upon the charge that he threatened his girlfriend, a charge that the trial court determined to be invalid. The determination that the threat had not been made invalidated the reason for the discharge from the Phoenix House program.
Because Rubio prevailed on the reason for his original arrest, he could not be “in some manner responsible” for his dismissal from the Phoenix House program and we must vacate the order of revocation of probation and the judgment and sentence imposed after revocation. We remand to the trial court for reinstatement of his original sentence.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
HARRIS, PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur.
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Harris v. State, 898 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002); Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 501 (Fla.1974). As part of such review, “there must be evidence in the record to support a finding that any violation was willful and substantial.” Rubio v. State, 824 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see Bernhardt, 288 So. 2d at 501 (concluding that the defendant received “due process ...; the evidence was sufficient to justify revocation; and the trial court did not abuse [its] discretion in revoking probation.”). W…
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Duquesne v. State, 242 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…a. 3d DCA 2010). Further, “[a]s part of such review, ‘there must be evidence in the record to support a finding that any violation was willful and substantial.’” Harris v. State, 898 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (quoting Rubio v. State, 824 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)). First, the State has properly conceded that at the probation violation hearing, it failed to introduce any evidence as to the new law offenses allegedly committed on July 13, 2016, charged in lower tribunal case number…
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Titus Henley v. State, 117 So. 3d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…edicated on counts XI-XX in case number F09-16471A. See Harris v. State, 898 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[T]here must be evidence in the record to support a finding that any violation was willful and substantial.” (quoting Rubio v. State, 824 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002))); see also Thompson v. State, 994 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“Hearsay evidence is admissible at probation revocation hearings as long as it is not the only evidence relied upon to revoke probation.”). We therefor…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- VAN Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Rainer v. State, 657 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Curry v. State, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Robbins v. Blackstone Valley Nat'l Bank, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)