METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY AND UNIVERSITY BAPTIST CHURCH, PETITIONERS,
v.
CHARLES DUSSEAU, JOSEPH M. BURKE, JUNE BURKE, CHRISTINE HARRIS, BURTON HARRIS, AND ALBERT ARMADA, RESPONDENTS
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Metropolitan Dade County and University Baptist Church sought mandamus or certiorari to enforce the appellate court's mandate on remand. The court found that the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, failed to follow the mandate by not addressing whether the County Commission's decision was supported by competent substantial evidence, and instead addressed matters outside the scope of the mandate.
The court held that the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, exceeded the mandate by failing to address whether the Commission's decision was supported by competent substantial evidence and by addressing matters not within the scope of the mandate. Upon issuance of an appellate mandate, the lower court's role is purely ministerial and it lacks discretionary power to alter or modify the mandate in any way.
[1] A lower court's role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court is purely ministerial and limited to obeying the appellate court's order.
[2] A trial court lacks discretionary power to alter or modify an appellate court's mandate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“becomes purely ministerial, and its function is limited to obeying the appellate court's order or decree. A trial court does not have discretionary power to alter or modify the mandate of an appellate court in any way, shape, or form.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that upon issuance of an appellate mandate, the lower court's role is limited to ministerial obedience without discretion to modify the mandate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Florida Supreme Court had remanded the case to the circuit court with specific instructions to apply the three-pronged Vaillant standard and deter…
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On Motion to Enforce Mandate and/or Petition for Writ of Certiorari
PER CURIAM.
In Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 794 So. 2d 1270, 1275 (Fla.2001), the Florida Supreme Court remanded the instant case to the circuit court and directed the circuit court “to apply the three-pronged standard of review set forth in Vaillant. Notably, when applying the third prong, the court should review the record to determine simply whether the Commission’s decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.” (emphasis in original).
Thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate to this Court directing that “further proceedings be had in accordance” with its opinion. This Court then issued an order vacating its prior opinion “except as is approved by the Supreme Court” and “adopting], as its own, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida.” This Court’s order also remanded to the circuit court “for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of the Supreme Court.”
Following this Court’s mandate, the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, issued its opinion. The petitioners, Metropolitan Dade County and University Baptist Church, petition this Court for a Writ of Mandamus or, in the alternative, for a Writ of Certiorari, contending that the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, exceeded this Court’s mandate.
We agree. Upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court, the lower court’s role “becomes purely ministerial, and its function is limited to obeying the appellate court’s order or decree. A trial court does not have discretionary power to alter or modify the mandate of an appellate court in any way, shape, or form.” Wilcox v. Hotelerama Assoc., Ltd., 619 So. 2d 444, 445-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (citations omitted); see Savage v. Macy’s East, Inc., 719 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 391 (Fla.1999); Milton v. Keith, 503 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
On remand, the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, was instructed to address “whether the Commission’s decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.” Dusseau, 794 So. 2d at 1275. A review of the opinion issued by the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, clearly indicates that this Court’s mandate was not followed. The Circuit Court, Appellate Division, deviated from this Court’s mandate by not addressing whether the Commission’s decision was supported by competent substantial evidence, and also by addressing matters that were not within the mandate. See Jones v. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, quash the order of the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this Court’s mandate. See Zel-man v. Metropolitan Dade County, 622 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982).
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Huffman v. Moore, 834 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…tment of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla.1984); Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dept. of Business & Professional Regulation v. Tampa Crown Distributors, Inc., 745 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Metropolitan Dade County v. Dusseau, 826 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Hill v. Palm Beach Polo, Inc., 805 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Toledo v. Hillsborough County Hospital, 747 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). For this reason, the circuit court should have acted upon our previous…
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Abdo v. Khalil Abdo (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…have also addressed improper postmandate rulings through motions to enforce mandates, see, e.g., Colina, 202 So. 3d at 954; Ketcher v. Ketcher, 198 So. 3d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), and even certiorari, see, e.g., Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Dusseau, 826 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Jones v. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In the absence of a motion to enforce mandate, prohibition appears to be the narrowest means through which we can resolve this case, and that is why we have chosen to…
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Soc. Media Ltd. LLC v. Khalil Abdo (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…have also addressed improper postmandate rulings through motions to enforce mandates, see, e.g., Colina, 202 So. 3d at 954; Ketcher v. Ketcher, 198 So. 3d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), and even certiorari, see, e.g., Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Dusseau, 826 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Jones v. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In the absence of a motion to enforce mandate, prohibition appears to be the narrowest means through which we can resolve this case, and that is why we have chosen to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City OF Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982)
- Dusseau v. Metro. Dade Cnty. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs, 794 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2001)
- Savage v. MacY'S E., Inc., 719 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Milton v. R.C. Keith, 503 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Jones v. The Honorable Francis X. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Ivory Wilcox and Ana Lee Wilcox v. Hotelerama Assocs., Ltd., 619 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Zelman v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 622 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)