T.T., PETITIONER,
v.
ENOC ESTEVES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BROWARD REGIONAL JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER, RESPONDENT
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A juvenile petitioner sought habeas corpus relief challenging his detention beyond twenty-one days in a secure juvenile detention facility. The court held that the state's mere assertion of intent to file adult charges, without demonstrating how the nature of the charges requires additional time for prosecution or defense, does not constitute "good cause" under Florida law to extend detention beyond the statutory limit.
The court held that merely notifying the court of intent to file adult charges, without an explanation as to why this requires additional time, does not constitute good cause as defined by the statute. Good cause examples include circumstances where witnesses are unavailable or an investigation is incomplete.
[1] A child may not be held in secure detention for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing has commenced in good faith.
[2] A court may extend juvenile detention time limits by an additional 9 days if the child is charged with a serious felony and good cause is shown.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Except as provided in paragraph (g), a child may not be held in secure, nonse-cure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court.”
The primary statutory provision establishing the twenty-one day detention limit for juveniles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceT.T., a juvenile, was held in secure detention beyond the initial twenty-one day limit. The trial court extended his detention for an additional nine …
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KLEIN, J.
Petitioner, a juvenile, seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he is being illegally held in secure detention for more than twenty-one days, contrary to the applicable statute. Although his petition has become moot, we address the issue because it is capable of repetition. Right v. Dugger, 574 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla.1990)(where otherwise moot issue is capable of repetition, it “should” be addressed on appeal).
Under section 985.215(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), it is provided:
Except as provided in paragraph (g), a child may not be held in secure, nonse-cure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court.
Section 985.215(5)(g), Florida Statutes (2001), provides:
Upon good cause being shown that the nature of the charge requires additional time for the prosecution or defense of the case, the court may extend the time limits for detention specified in paragraph (c) an additional 9 days if the child is charged with an offense that would be, if committed by an adult, a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree involving violence against any individual
In this case the trial court extended petitioner’s detention for an additional nine days under section 985.215(5)(g) based on the state’s assertion that it intended to file charges against petitioner in adult court. The crimes charged are encompassed by section 985.215(5)(g), but petitioner contends that the state did not establish good cause, i.e., “that the nature of the charge requires additional time for prosecution or defense of the case.” Id.
In B.G. v. Fryer, 570 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), one of the petitioners was being held for more than twenty-one days on various grounds, one of which was that the state was considering prosecuting him as an adult. We concluded that this was not a sufficient ground and agreed with E.W. v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), in which the first district suggested that examples of good cause (which was not defined then) would be where witnesses are unavailable or an investigation is incomplete. Merely notifying the court that the state intends to file adult charges, without an explanation as to why this requires additional time, is not good cause as defined by the statute. The petition is dismissed as moot.
STONE and MAY, JJ., concur.
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K.E. v. Dep't OF Juv. Just., 963 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…ever, Florida courts have frequently addressed juvenile detention issues after the expiration of the order at issue because they are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” See K.P. v. State, 952 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); W.B.T. v. Esteves, 825 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); T.C. v. Layne, 725 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Juvenile detention is a remedy that is used only for a brief period of time. Furthermore, the subsequent home detention…
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A.M. v. State, 147 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…court can complete its review and render a merits decision. CJ. v. Rolle, 608 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); J.L.B. v. Kelly, 93 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); K.E. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 963 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).…
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J.L.B. v. Kelly, 93 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…m detention shortly after the petition was filed, we dismissed the petition as moot. However, because the improper scoring of the Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) by the circuit court is capable of repetition yet evading review, see T.T. v. Esieves, 828 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), we issue this opinion. When J.L.B. appeared before the court for an initial detention hearing, he scored nine points on the RAI. At that time, a representative from the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) indicated that J…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kight v. Dugger, 574 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990)
- E.W. v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- B.G. v. Fryer, 570 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Musico v. State, 570 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)