MARY J. BOYD, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
RONALD GOFF, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court dismissed an appeal as untimely because the appellants failed to appeal within 30 days of the trial court's September 25, 2001 order granting summary judgment, which was a final appealable order despite its potentially misleading caption.
The trial court's September 25, 2001 order constituted a final appealable order despite its potentially misleading caption, and because the appeal was filed 44 days after that order rather than within the required 30 days, the appeal is untimely and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
[1] An order that grants a motion for summary judgment and explicitly states that final summary judgment is entered in favor of a party against the opposing party is an appea…
[2] The label of a court order does not determine its legal effect; the operative language within the order controls.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order which merely grants a motion for summary judgment, without more, is not an appealable final order.”
Establishes the general rule that summary judgment orders are not appealable unless they contain additional language establishing finality.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 25, 2001, the trial court entered an 'Order Granting Final Summary Judgment' in favor of defendant Metra Electronics Corporation, dismiss…
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PLEUS, J.
This case is a good example of why it is important to understand what a court order does and not focus only on how the order is labeled. On September 25, 2001, the trial court entered an “Order Granting Final Summary Judgment.” The label perhaps is misleading because the order grants the appellee, Metra Electronic’s motion for summary judgment but continues with the following language: “3. Final Summary Judgment is entered herein in favor of Defendant Metra Electronics Corporation and against the Plaintiffs.”
On November 1, 2001, the trial court signed a “Final Summary Judgment.” It reads: “It is adjudged that Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant Metra Electronics Corporation and against the Plaintiffs who shall take nothing by this action and that the Defendant Metra Electronics Corporation shall go hence without day.”
On November 8, 2001, 44 days after entry of the initial “Order Granting Final Summary Judgment,” the plaintiffs appealed the “Final Summary Judgment,” which had been entered on November 1, 2001. Sua sponte, this court issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as one that is untimely in that the appeal was not filed within 30 days of the entry of a final order. Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(b). The appellants responded that the order of September 25, 2001 was not an appealable order because it merely granted the motion for summary judgment. In fact, it does more.
“An order which merely grants a motion for summary judgment, without more, is not an appealable final order.” McQuaig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). While titled an “Order Granting Summary Judgment,” this order did more than grant the appellants’ motion. The order specified that certain counts of the complaint, those that were against Metra, were dismissed and that, “Final Summary Judgment is entered herein in favor of Defendant Me-tra Electronics Corporation and against the Plaintiffs.”
In State Farm, Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Open MRI of Orlando, Inc., 780 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), this court found an order with nearly the exact language constituted an appealable final order. The instant order, like the one in State Farm, was self-executing and the language employed “did not contemplate any further judicial labor with regard to the rights of the parties, and is sufficient under the case law to establish finality.” Id. at 340. The “Order Granting Final Summary Judgment,” being a final one, needed to be appealed within 30 days of its entry.
In that the notice of appeal was untimely, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal. McQuaig. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
COBB and PALMER, JJ., concur.
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Ball v. Genesis Outsourcing Solutions, LLC, 174 So. 3d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…which the Florida Supreme Court has placed at the end of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. An appropriate order granting final summary judgment could be captioned “Final Summary Judgment,” although the title is not controlling. See Boyd v. Goff, 828 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). For a plaintiff, a final summary judgment should have language that reads something like the following: “The motion for summary judgment is granted. Final judgment is entered as follows. The plaintiff [name and address] shall r…
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Zabawa v. Gaeton "Guy" Della Penna, 868 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…1). The fact that the order is labeled “Second Amended Final Judgment” does not control. It is the substance of the order, not the label affixed to it, that determines its nature for purposes of section 4(b)(1) and rule 9.030(b)(1)(A). Boyd v. Goff, 828 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Appellant alternatively asks that we treat his Notice of Appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to rule 9.030(b)(2)(A), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a condition precedent to invoking a district court’…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McQUAIG v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Open MRI OF Orlando, Inc., 780 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)