WILLIE KINSEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2002-12-13
No. 2D02-2938
DAVIS and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
831 So. 2d 1253 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

Willie Kinsey appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The court reversed the habitual felony offender sentences imposed for two life felonies committed during a constitutional window period (October 1, 1995 to May 24, 1997) but affirmed the sentences for three first-degree felonies, remanding for resentencing under the 1994 sentencing guidelines.


Holding

Habitual felony offender sentences for life felonies committed during the statutory window period must be reversed. The trial court must resentence Kinsey under the 1994 version of the sentencing guidelines applicable to his offense date, with discretion to impose an upward departure sentence if permissible reasons exist.


Headnotes

[1] Habitual felony offender sentences imposed for life felonies committed between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997, are subject to challenge as unconstitutional.

[2] A defendant whose habitual felony offender sentence for a life felony committed during the unconstitutional window period is invalidated must be resentenced under the sen…

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Key Quotes

“Prior to the enactment of chapter 95-182, a defendant convicted of a life felony was not subject to an enhanced punishment as a habitual felony offender. However, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla.1999), struck down chapter 95-182 as unconstitutional.”

Establishes the constitutional defect in the statute authorizing enhanced sentences for life felonies and sets up the basis for invalidating Kinsey's sentences.

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Facts & Procedural History

Kinsey was convicted of two life felonies and three first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment. He was sentenced to five concurrent habitua…

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Opinion of the Court
CASANUEVA, Judge.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

Willie Kinsey appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Kinsey is currently serving five concurrent habitual felony offender sentences of life in prison imposed for convictions of two life felonies and three first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment. We affirm without comment the order of the trial court with regard to the sentences imposed for the three first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment. However, we reverse the order of the trial court with regard to the sentences imposed for the two life felonies with directions for the trial court to vacate those sentences and to resentence Kinsey.

In 1997, Kinsey’s sentencing court had authority to sentence him as a habitual felony offender for his life felonies pursuant to chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida. Prior to the enactment of chapter 95-182, a defendant convicted of a life felony was not subject to an enhanced punishment as a habitual felony offender. However, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1999), struck down chapter 95-182 as unconstitutional. The imposition of a habitual felony offender sentence for a life felony can be challenged under the authority of Thompson if the life felony was committed between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997. See Green v. State, 810 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the window period for challenging the enhanced sentencing provisions created by chapter 95-182 is from October 1, 1995, to May 24, 1997).

Since Kinsey’s life felonies were committed on January 27, 1997, during the window period, the habitual felony offender sentences imposed for them must be reversed. This court in Everett v. State, 770 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), invalidated a habitual felony offender sentence for a life felony committed during the window period and directed on remand that the trial court resentence the defendant under the version of the sentencing guidelines proper for the date on which the offense was committed. This court also noted that the trial court has the discretion at resentencing to impose an upward departure sentence if one or more permissible reasons are applicable.

On remand, Kinsey must be resentenced under the 1994 version of the sentencing guidelines since his offense date is also within the window period for relief pursuant to Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). See DeMonia v. State, 806 So. 2d 545, 546 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (recognizing that the window period for a Heggs challenge is from October 1, 1995, to May 24, 1997). In addition, as authorized by Everett, the trial court at resentencing has the discretion to impose an upward departure sentence if one or more permissible reasons are applicable.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

DAVIS and KELLY, JJ., Concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Cook v. State, 866 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
    …period on May 24, 1997. Lewis v. State, 764 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Cook committed his offense on May 4,1997. Accordingly, Cook’s habitual offender sentence for the life felony of attempted first degree murder is illegal. Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Lowe v. State, 786 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Woodson v. State, 777 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001);. James v. State, 775 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We reverse the trial court’s order denying Cook’s motion and r…
  • Ford v. State, 868 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …n chapter 95-182 as unconstitutional. The imposition of a habitual offender sentence for a life felony can be challenged under the authority of Thompson if the life felony was committed between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997. See Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Because Ford’s offense occurred on May 8, 1997, Ford’s habitual felony offender sentence for attempted [*632] first-degree murder, a life felony, falls within the window of Thompson. His habitual felony offender sentence, therefo…
  • Wheeler v. State, 129 So. 3d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
    …d that when a defendant committed a life felony between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997, and was habitualized, the sentence must be vacated and the defendant must be resentenced under the 1994 version of the sentencing guidelines. Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000)); see also Everett v. State, 770 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Because Wheeler committed the offense on or about June 27, 1996, within the Heggs window period for relie…

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