EDWARD FORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Edward Ford challenges his habitual felony offender sentence for attempted first-degree murder, a life felony committed in 1997. The court reverses the sentence for count six (attempted first-degree murder) because it falls within the window period for relief under State v. Thompson, which struck down the statute allowing enhanced habitual offender sentences for life felonies.
The court reverses Ford's habitual felony offender sentence for count six (attempted first-degree murder) because his offense date falls within the relief window established by State v. Thompson (between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997), and directs resentencing under the 1994 version of the sentencing guidelines. The court affirms all other sentences.
[1] A habitual felony offender sentence imposed for a life felony committed between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997, is subject to challenge based on the unconstitutionalit…
[2] A defendant whose habitual felony offender sentence for a life felony is reversed due to the unconstitutionality of the habitual offender statute must be resentenced unde…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“prior to the enactment of chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, a defendant convicted of a life felony was not subject to an enhanced punishment as a habitual offender”
Establishes the law before the challenged statute and the basis for challenging habitual offender enhancement for life felonies
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn October 9, 1998, Ford was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to multiple sentences including life imprisonment for attempted first-degree murd…
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STRINGER, Judge.
Edward Ford challenges the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). On October 9, 1998, Ford was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to life in prison for count one, armed burglary, thirty years in prison for count two, aggravated battery, life in prison for count five, armed burglary, life in prison for count six, attempted first-degree murder, thirty years in prison for count eight, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and ten years in prison for count nine, aggravated stalking. We reverse the order of the trial court with regard to the sentence imposed for count six, attempted first-degree murder with directions for the trial court to vacate that sentence and resentence Ford. We affirm without comment the order of the trial court with regard to the other sentences.
As this court stated in Everett v. State, 770 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), prior to the enactment of chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, a defendant convicted of a life felony was not subject to an enhanced punishment as a habitual offender. However, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1999), struck down chapter 95-182 as unconstitutional. The imposition of a habitual offender sentence for a life felony can be challenged under the authority of Thompson if the life felony was committed between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997. See Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Because Ford’s offense occurred on May 8, 1997, Ford’s habitual felony offender sentence for attempted first-degree murder, a life felony, falls within the window of Thompson. His habitual felony offender sentence, therefore, must be reversed.
On remand, Ford must be resentenced under the 1994 version of the sentencing guidelines since his offense date is also within the window period for relief pursuant to Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). In addition, as authorized by this court in Everett, the trial court at resentencing has the discretion to impose an upward departure sentence if one or more permissible reasons are applicable.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
WHATLEY and WALLACE, JJ„ concur.
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Hawkins v. State, 195 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…l Procedure 3.850. However, the weight of authority holds that such claims may properly be raised pursuant to rule 3.800(a). See Simmons v. State, 180 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Wheeler v. State, 129 So. 3d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Ford v. State, 868 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Cook v. State, 866 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Bines v. State, 837 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Green v. State, 810 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Lowe v. State, 786…
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Ford v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 558 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (M.D. Fla. 2008)…summary nature of the proceeding, the State did not file an answer brief. On March 12, 2004, in Case No. 2D03-2687, the appellate court filed a written order affirming in part and reversing in part Ford’s sentence. (Exhibit 21). Ford v. State, 868 So.2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The appellate court reversed the order of the trial court with regard to the habitual felony offender sentence imposed for count six, attempted first-degree murder, with directions for the trial court to vacate that sentence and…
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Burgess v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. (S.D. Fla. 2022)…s the State explained, “[a]lthough a 1996 version of [FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)] authorized a HVFO designation for life felonies, adoption of the legislation providing this authorization has been held unconstitutional.” Ibid. (citing Ford v. State, 868 So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). At the same time, the State disagreed that Burgess was legally entitled to a resentencing hearing because, in the State’s view, he could have lawfully received the same sentence—with or without the HVFO designation. See…
Authorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)
- Everett v. State, 770 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)