CLEVELAND GRANT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed summary denial of defendant's motion for additional county jail credit, holding that the Department of Corrections computes such credit and defendant must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
A defendant seeking additional county jail credit against his sentence must exhaust administrative remedies with the Department of Corrections before pursuing judicial relief.
[1] A defendant seeking additional county jail credit must exhaust administrative remedies with the Department of Corrections before pursuing judicial relief through mandamus…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCleveland Grant sought additional county jail credit applied against his eight-year sentence in a criminal case. The trial court summarily denied his …
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court’s summary denial of appellant’s 3.800(a) motion for additional county jail credit applied against his eight-year sentence in case no. 97-24413 CF10. The allegations of his motion are insufficient to show entitlement to additional credit. The Department of Corrections (“Department”) is responsible for computing credit for time spent in county jail after sentencing. See § 921.161(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). If the post-sentence credit is incorrect, appellant should pursue his administrative remedies. If appellant is not satisfied after exhausting his administrative remedies, then he can file a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court in the county in which he is incarcerated. See Jefferson v. State, 830 So. 2d 195, 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Colson v. State, 830 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Killings v. State, 567 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The county jail where appellant was incarcerated after sentencing was required, when delivering Grant to the Department, to certify in writing “[t]he date the sentence was imposed and the date the prisoner was delivered to the department.” See § 921.161(2)(a). Our affirmance in this case is without prejudice to pursue appropriate remedies.
AFFIRMED.
FARMER, KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (21 total)
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Stovall v. Sergeant William Cooper, 860 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…s v. State, 713 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Barber v. State, 661 So. 2d 355, 356 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Singletary v. Powell, 602 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Curry v. Wainwright, 419 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). But see Grant v. State, 837 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that the remedy for a defendant who was not given the proper gain time is to file a petition for a writ of mandamus in the county where he is incarcerated); Ashley v. Singletary, 706 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (same…
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Fulcher v. State, 875 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…endant says, that in sentencing a defendant after revocation of probation on a split sentence, the defendant is to be given credit for all time previously served, including the prior incarceration in the Department of Corrections. See Ryan v. State, 837 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). That is so unless there has been an affirmative waiver of credit for time served. Ryan, 837 So. 2d at 1076. There was no waiver in this case. It is equally clear, however, that in this case there has been a mutual mistake of fac…
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Joyner v. State, 988 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…t is to be provided from a particular date.2 The defendant contends that there is a conflict between the language just quoted in Johnson and four of this court’s earlier decisions: Griffin v. State, 838 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Ryan v. State, 837 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Sommers v. State, 829 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); and Cozza v. State, 756 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). We conclude that all of the cases are distinguishable and that there is no internal decisional conflict. In Cozza, this…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Forney v. State, 567 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Killings v. State, 567 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Jefferson v. State, 830 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Johnson v. State, 830 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Colson v. State, 830 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)