PHILLIP A. WEBSTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Webster appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), claiming he was illegally sentenced as both a habitual felony offender (HFO) and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) for one criminal episode, and that his sentence was illegal under Taylor v. State. The court affirmed, finding his first claim facially insufficient and his second claim meritless.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Webster's motion. The first claim was facially insufficient because Webster did not allege that he received both HFO and PRR designations for the same offense—he did not specify which offenses resulted in which designations. The second claim was meritless because Webster's January 1988 sentence predated the enactment of chapter 99-188, so the statute's unconstitutionality could not apply to his case.
[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence is facially insufficient if it fails to allege that the defendant received both habitual felony offender and prison releasee reoff…
[2] A defendant may be sentenced as both a habitual felony offender and a prison releasee reoffender for different offenses committed during a single criminal episode.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Such a sentence is illegal for purposes of rule 3.800(a) if a defendant received both HFO and PRR designations for the same offense.”
Establishes the legal standard for when dual HFO and PRR designations constitute an illegal sentence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWebster was sentenced in January 1988. He filed a motion to correct his sentence under Rule 3.800(a), raising two grounds: first, that he was illegall…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Facially Insufficient Claim cases and more on FLexlaw
DAVIS, Judge.
Phillip Webster challenges the order of the trial court denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Webster raised two grounds for relief in his motion. We affirm the order of the trial court since Webster’s first claim is facially insufficient and his second claim is meritless.
In his first ground, Webster alleged that he was illegally sentenced as both a habitual felony offender (HFO) and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) “for one criminal episode.” Such a sentence is illegal for purposes of rule 3.800(a) if a defendant received both HFO and PRR designations for the same offense. See Tolbert v. State, 827 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The trial court, in denying Webster’s motion, did not address this claim. However, Webster did not present a facially sufficient claim. A PRR designation is only applicable where the defendant has com mitted an enumerated offense. See § 775.082(8)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (1997). It does not apply to all offenses. Clearly, a defendant could, in one single episode, commit an offense that is subject to a PRR designation and commit another offense that is not subject to a PRR designation but is subject to an HFO designation. Neither Webster’s motion nor the trial court’s order tells us anything regarding the offense or offenses for which Webster was sentenced. Because Webster did not allege that he received both PRR and HFO designations for a single offense, his claim is facially insufficient. Our affir-mance on this issue is without prejudice to any right Webster might have to present a facially sufficient claim that he was illegally sentenced as both a PRR and an HFO on the same offense.
In his second ground, Webster claims that his sentence or sentences are illegal pursuant to Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed by 821 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2002). Taylor held that chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, was unconstitutional since it was enacted in violation of the single subject rule. Chapter 99-188 amended portions of both the HFO and PRR statutes. In his motion, Webster alleges that he was sentenced in January 1988. This was prior to the enactment of chapter 99-188. See Taylor. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of this claim.
Affirmed.
NORTHCUTT and SALCINES, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Theron Martin v. State, 888 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…argues that he cannot be sentenced as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual offender for a single conviction. We conclude that the language Mr. Martin relies on in Tolbert v. State, 827 So. 2d 278 (Fla.2d DCA 2002), and Webster v. State, 837 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), is taken out of context. Because the sentences are authorized by Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000), we affirm. The State charged Mr. Martin with attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm for ev…1 / 2
-
Powell v. State, 881 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…nt is eligible for a harsher sentence, the trial court may impose the harsher sentence. Also, the PRR statute is only applicable if a defendant has committed an enumerated offense and only if the state requests such a sentence. See Webster v. State, 837 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). It is entirely possible that a defendant could commit an enumerated offense subject to PRR designation and another offense not enumerated, or one for which the state does not seek such a sentence, in the same criminal episode. Th…
Authorities Cited
- Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Tolbert v. State, 827 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)