THERON MARTIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Theron Martin appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm, arguing he could not be sentenced as both a prison releasee reoffender and habitual offender for a single conviction. The court affirmed, holding that under Grant v. State, both enhancements are permissible if the habitual offender sentence is longer than the prison releasee reoffender sentence.
Under Grant v. State, a defendant may receive both a habitual offender enhancement and a prison releasee reoffender enhancement for the same offense, provided the habitual offender sentence is longer than the prison releasee reoffender sentence.
[1] A defendant may be sentenced as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual offender for a single conviction, provided the habitual offender sentence is longer than…
[2] Sentences imposed under the habitual offender statute may be enhanced by the prison releasee reoffender statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the sentences are authorized by Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000), we affirm.”
Establishes the controlling authority permitting dual sentencing enhancements under the conditions stated in Grant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMartin was charged with attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm on September 15, 2001. The State filed notices qualifying …
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ALTENBERND, Chief Judge.
Theron Martin appeals his judgments and sentences for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated assault. He argues that he cannot be sentenced as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual offender for a single conviction. We conclude that the language Mr. Martin relies on in Tolbert v. State, 827 So. 2d 278 (Fla.2d DCA 2002), and Webster v. State, 837 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), is taken out of context. Because the sentences are authorized by Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000), we affirm.
The State charged Mr. Martin with attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm for events occurring on September 15, 2001. The State filed a notice of qualification as a prison releasee reoffender and a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment as a habitual offender. Thereafter, Mr. Martin entered into a negotiated plea to be sentenced for the lesser offense of aggravated battery with a firearm. For this offense, he agreed to a thirty-year sentence of imprisonment as a habitual offender with a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory term for use of the firearm and a fifteen-year minimum mandatory term as a prison releasee reoffender. He also pleaded guilty to the charge of aggravated assault with a firearm and received a shorter concurrent term of imprisonment for that offense.
In this appeal, Mr. Martin challenges his sentence for aggravated battery. The sentence, however, is authorized by statute. See §§ 775.082(3)(c), ,084(4)(a), ,087(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2001).
Mr. Martin argues that he cannot be sentenced as both a prison releasee reoffender and as a habitual offender for the aggravated battery. Under the holding in Grant, 770 So. 2d 655, he can receive both enhancements to his sentence so long as the habit ual offender sentence is longer than, not equal to or shorter than, the term required as a prison releasee reoffender. Mr. Martin relies exclusively on two cases, Tolbert, 827 So. 2d 278, and Webster, 837 So. 2d 1080. Tolbert involved a defendant who received a prison releasee reof-fender sentence that was equal in length to his habitual offender sentence, but the sentences were imposed for separate offenses. In dicta, that opinion includes the phrase, “Although Grant precludes the imposition of both an HFO and a PRR designation on the same offense.” Tolbert, 827 So. 2d at 279. Because of the facts in Tolbert, the opinion did not qualify this statement with language such as “when the HFO term is equal to or less than the PRR term.” The same is true in Webster. In neither case did this court intend to conflict with Grant, and in both cases our ruling followed Grant.
Accordingly, neither Tolbert nor Webster provides any basis for relief for Mr. Martin. We therefore affirm Mr. Martin’s judgments and sentences.
Affirmed.
WHATLEY, J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., Senior Judge, Concur.
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Wallace v. State, 128 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…een years’ imprisonment. The case law explains that she can receive concurrent sentencing under both of these statutes so long as the habitual offender sentence is longer. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla.2000); see also Martin v. State, 888 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); State v. Manning, 839 So. 2d 849, 850-51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Smith v. State, 754 So. 2d 100,101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). If the trial court had imposed a twenty-year sentence as a habitual offender with a concurrent fifteen-year mi…
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Morales v. State, 901 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…in Lewis v. State, 751 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Apparently, if the incarcerative portion of the split sentence were one day longer, there would be no issue that the components of this sentence were legal. Id. at 107; see also Martin v. State, 888 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). We do not reach the substance of Mr. Morales’ argument because our record does not contain the challenged sentence. The trial court claims that the sentence for count II is not a true split sentence and that the components of th…
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Ross v. State, 149 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Martin v. State, 888 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Austin v. State, 968 So'.2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); State v. Manning, 839 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Paul v. State, 830 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). DAVIS, C.J., and CRENSHAW and BLACK, JJ., Concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- Tolbert v. State, 827 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Webster v. State, 837 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)