JAMES BROOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Brooks appealed his sentence as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO), arguing that carjacking—the predicate offense used to enhance his sentence—is not an enumerated offense under Florida's sentencing statute. The court agreed and reversed, holding that carjacking does not qualify as a basis for HVFO enhancement despite involving elements of robbery.
The court held that carjacking is not an enumerated offense under section 775.084(1)(b) and therefore cannot be used to enhance a sentence as a habitual violent felony offender. Although carjacking involves robbery elements and robbery is enumerated, the Legislature separately classified these crimes and did not include carjacking as a qualifying offense for HVFO enhancement.
[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence is the proper procedural vehicle to challenge a sentence that is illegal on the face of the record.
[2] A sentence is illegal if it imposes a kind of punishment that no judge could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A sentence is "illegal" if it imposes a "kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances."”
Establishes the standard for what constitutes an illegal sentence reviewable under Rule 3.800(a)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrooks was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender to ten years in prison with an additional five-year mand…
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PER CURIAM.
James Brooks filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). While he raised several issues, we address one. He contends he was improperly sentenced as a habitual violent offender based upon the offense of carjacking, which is not an enumerated offense on which to base enhancement under section 775.084(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2000). We agree and reverse.
Because this error is apparent from the face of the record, a Rule 3.800(a) motion is the proper vehicle to raise this challenge. See Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1180 (Fla.2001). A sentence is “illegal” if it imposes a “kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.” Id. at 1181, (quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1186-87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
Brooks was convicted of attempted robbery, Case No. 00-19029, and sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender (“HVFO”) to ten years in prison with an enhancement of five years minimum mandatory imprisonment. See § 775.084(l)(b), (4)(b). Brooks challenged this sentence as the offense relied upon to habitualize him, carjacking, was not an enumerated offense upon which enhancement is authorized. Brooks is correct; carjacking is not an offense enumerated under section 775.084(l)(b)l.
The state argues that because carjacking involves a robbery, and robbery is an enumerated offense, .Brooks qualifies as an HVFO. See Fryer v. State, 732 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). While Fryer held that robbery is a necessarily lesser included offense of carjacking, that is unrelated to the statutory sentencing scheme. Carjacking and robbery are still classified as separate offenses. See Cruller v. State, 808 So. 2d 201, 204 (Fla.2002) (concluding the Legislature intended to authorize separate punishments for carjacking and robbery and convictions for both, arising out of the same transaction, did not violate double jeopardy).
A plain reading of the statute, moreover, undermines the state’s argument. The Legislature was aware of the differences in the crimes, as it included carjacking as a qualified offense for a three time violent felony offender in section 775.084(l)(c)l.q., yet it chose not to include it as a qualifying offense for HVFO status. When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statu tory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. See Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 299 (Fla.2000).
The order below denying Brooks’ motion is reversed and the matter remanded for a proper sentence to be entered. On remand, the state would be entitled to present evidence of another prior conviction that would support the enhancement if appellant failed to object to the enhanced sentence when it was imposed. See Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (Fla.2001).
Reversed and remanded.
STONE, WARNER and MAY, JJ., concur.
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T.N. v. State, 896 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…or robbery by sudden snatching to be included under the offense of robbery because “robbery requires the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, section 812.13, while robbery by sudden snatching does not.” Id.; see also Brooks v. State, 837 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that a defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender based on the offense of carjacking because carjacking was not included under the enumerated offense of robbery). We conclude that the offense…
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Brooks v. State, 873 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…rjacking, the offense used to qualify Brooks as a habitual felony offender, is not an enumerated offense under section 775.084(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2000). This court reversed and remanded for a proper sentence to be entered. See Brooks v. State, 837 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). On May 23, 2003, in response to this court’s opinion, the trial court entered an order vacating the previous Judgment and Sentence and- scheduled a re-sentencing hearing. Immediately prior to the re-sentencing hearing, the stat…
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Plummer v. State, 969 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…We remand for resentencing in connection with one point. The trial court agreed with Plummer that the violent habitual offender and related mandatory minimum portion of his sentence should be stricken with respect to LT 04-11634. Brooks v. State, 837 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In so doing, the court did not determine that a resen-tencing hearing was required. We remand for the trial court to conduct a de novo sentencing hearing. See Ross v. State, 901 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also Tumblin v…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)
- Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2001)
- Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2000)
- Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Cruller v. State, 808 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2002)
- Doyle Fryer v. State, 732 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)