MICHAEL LILES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a true split sentence limits the maximum incarceration upon revocation to the original incarceration period.
Appellant received a true split sentence of suspended incarceration and probation. After violating probation, the trial court imposed a longer incarce…
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PER CURIAM.
Michael Liles, appellant, challenges the sentence entered upon his revocation of probation. He contends that because he initially received a true split sentence of three years’ incarceration (suspended) and eight years’ sex offender probation, the trial court could not now sentence Mm to three years’ incarceration and ten years’ sex offender probation. We agree and reverse.
On January 11, 2001, the trial court accepted appellant’s plea of attempted sexual battery upon a child under age twelve, a lesser included offense, and followed the State’s recommendation for a suspended sentence of three years’ incarceration followed by eight years’ sex offender probation. Appellant admitted violating his probation on October 16, 2001, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of three years’ incarceration followed by ten years’ probation.
As properly conceded by the State, because appellant’s original sentence was a true split sentence, the maximum sentence he could receive for violating his probation was three years’ incarceration. Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988); State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1997); Crawford v. State, 763 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Kelly v. State, 762 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Accordingly, we reverse with instructions for the trial court to sentence appellant to not more than three years’ incarceration with credit for time served.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
DAVIS, BROWNING and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Snell v. State, 902 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…en expanded to include sentences in which the entire in-carcerative term is suspended, and sentences in which the probationary term is longer than the suspended jail term.” Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also Liles v. State, 837 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration (suspended) and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence). Essentially, these cases recognize that imposing a suspending sentence followed…
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Osborn v. State, 4 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…plit sentence, the maximum sentence he could receive for violating his probation was fifteen years’ incarceration with credit for time served. See Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988); State v. Powell; 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1997); Liles v. State, 837 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Crawford v. State, 763 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Accordingly, we reverse with instructions for the trial court to sentence Appellant to not more than fifteen years’ incarceration with credit for time served. We affirm all…
Authorities Cited
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1997)
- Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- MSP Prods., Inc. v. Coastal Constr. Prods., Inc., 763 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Crawford v. State, 763 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Kelly v. State, 762 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)