PHILLIP EARL SUTTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Sutton appealed a trial court order on his Rule 3.800(a) motion regarding sentencing credit. The court held that while the Department of Corrections may calculate prison credit amounts, the trial court has the responsibility to order that defendants receive the prison credit to which they are entitled when resentenced after violating probation.
The trial court has the responsibility to order that defendants receive the prison credit to which they are entitled, although it may delegate to the Department of Corrections the task of calculating the correct amount of prison credit.
[1] A trial court has the responsibility to order that defendants receive prison credit to which they are entitled, even if the Department of Corrections is tasked with calcu…
[2] A trial court may delegate to the Department of Corrections the task of determining the correct amount of prison credit when a defendant is resentenced after violating pr…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court is incorrect. Although the trial court may delegate to the Department of Corrections the task of determining the correct amount of prison credit when a defendant is resentenced after violating the probationary portion of a probationary split sentence, it is the responsibility of the trial court to order that defendants receive the prison credit to which they are entitled.”
Establishes the core holding that the trial court must order prison credit even if it delegates calculation to the Department of Corrections
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSutton was serving probationary split sentences in three cases. Upon violation of the probationary portions, he was resentenced to prison. Sutton file…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion For Credit For Time Served cases and more on FLexlaw
[*617] SILBERMAN, Judge.
Phillip Sutton challenges the order of the trial court granting his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
In his motion, Sutton alleged that he was not awarded credit in three trial court cases for the time he previously spent in prison in each case prior to his being re-sentenced to prison upon violation of the probationary portions of his probationary split sentences. In its order, the trial court awarded Sutton credit for time spent in jail prior to sentencing.
Regarding Sutton’s prison credit claim, the trial court acknowledged that Sutton is “entitled to the time actually served on the prison sentence first imposed to be credited against those sentences he is currently serving [upon] violating probation.” However, the trial court found that “the Department of Corrections, not the trial court, has the responsibility of granting postsentencing jail time credit (actual time spent in prison).” The trial court is incorrect. Although the trial court may delegate to the Department of Corrections the task of determining the correct amount of prison credit when a defendant is resen-tenced after violating the probationary portion of a probationary split sentence, it is the responsibility of the trial court to order that defendants receive the prison credit to which they are entitled. See Downing v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).1
We therefore reverse the order of the trial court in regard to Sutton’s prison credit claim and remand to the trial court for further consideration. If Sutton has not been previously awarded credit in each case for the time he spent in prison prior to his being resentenced to prison, the trial court shall award him such credit.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
WHATLEY and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur. . In Downing, the award of prison credit could have been accomplished by placing a check in the appropriate box on the written sentence. However, in the present case, there were no judgments and sentences filed with the clerk of the circuit court. Instead, the trial court utilized snap-outs or memoranda of sentences which do not have a separate box for an award of prison credit. This court has repeatedly criticized the use of these memoranda because of the "mischief” that they can cause on appellate review. See Heath v. State, 840 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Furthermore, as we have also frequently mentioned, a memorandum of sentence cannot serve as a formal order of revocation of probation. See Braswell v. State, 804 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Woods v. State, 987 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…row range of conduct constituting direct criminal contempt discussed in this opinion. Reversed and remanded. NORTHCUTT, C.J., Concurs. LaROSE, J., Concurs in result only. . See Abridge v. Crow, 903 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Sutton v. State, 838 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Gordon v. State, 827 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Braswell v. State, 804 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Monroe v. State, 760 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Grantham v. State, 735 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Peterson v. State…
-
Zaborowski v. State, 126 So. 3d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…ed until February 10, 2009, long after his untolled probationary period would have expired. . This court repeatedly has expressed concern over the use of snap-out sentencing memoran-da based on the mischief that they can cause. See Sutton v. State, 838 So. 2d 616, 617 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Heath v. State, 840 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Richardson v. State, 761 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Peterson v. State, 730 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Grantham v. State, 735 So. 2d 525, 526 (F…
-
Barnes v. State, 74 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…ounty jail prior to the original sentence, it was beyond the DOC’s authority to award such credit and that Barnes, therefore, had to seek recourse with the postconviction court followed by appellate review of any adverse ruling. See Sutton v. State, 838 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Although the trial court may delegate to the [DOC] the task of determining the correct amount of prison credit when a defendant is resentenced after violating the probationary portion of a probationary split sentence, it is…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Downing v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Braswell v. State, 804 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Heath v. State, 840 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Cummings v. State, 779 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)