DAVID P. SNIPES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Snipes challenges the trial court's dismissal of his post-conviction motion as untimely. The appellate court reverses, holding that the two-year filing deadline under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b) begins when a sentence becomes final, not when the original judgment is affirmed on direct appeal.
The two-year time limitation of rule 3.850(b) commences when the sentence becomes final, not when the original judgment is affirmed. Snipes's motion filed on January 4, 2002, was timely because it was filed within two years of January 16, 2001, when the appellate court's mandate affirming the remanded sentence issued.
[1] A rule 3.850 motion is timely if filed within two years of the date that both the conviction and the sentence become final.
[2] The two-year period for filing a rule 3.850 motion does not commence until both the conviction and the sentence are final, even if the conviction itself became final at a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case....”
The rule establishing the two-year deadline for post-conviction motions, which the court interpreted to mean the deadline runs from when the sentence becomes final
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSnipes was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction but reversed his death sentence,…
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DAVIS, Judge.
David P. Snipes challenges the trial court’s order denying as untimely his post-conviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse.
Snipes was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed his conviction but reversed his death sentence with directions to the trial court to impose upon remand a sentence of life imprisonment. Snipes v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1999). The supreme court’s mandate issued on this direct appeal on May 24, 1999. After the trial court complied with the supreme court’s mandate and imposed a life sentence, Snipes appealed that sentence to this court. This court affirmed his sentence, Snipes v. State, 781 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), and issued its mandate on January 16, 2001.
On January 4, 2002, Snipes filed a post-conviction motion in the trial court, the denial of which is the subject of this proceeding. The trial court’s order determined that the judgment that Snipes was attacking became final when the mandate issued from the supreme court affirming the judgment on May 24, 1999, and that the two-year time limitation of rule 3.850(b) began to run at that time, thus rendering his January 4, 2002, motion untimely. Snipes argues that the time limitation of the rule did not commence until this court’s affirmance of his sentence on remand became final on January 16, 2001.
The unequivocal language of rule 3.850(b) supports Snipes’ contention:
A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case....
(Emphasis added.) See also Oliver v. State, 734 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that the two-year time limitation of rule 3.850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final).
We also note the well-established principle that while appeal proceedings are pending in an appellate court, the trial court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of a motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to rule 3.850. Daniels v. State, 712 So. 2d 765, 765 (Fla.1998); Cannady v. State, 771 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). As such, had Snipes filed his postconviction motion during the pendency of the appeal in this court, the trial court would have been without jurisdiction to entertain it. Snipes’s two-year window to pursue postconviction relief, under the trial court’s analysis of this issue, would have been reduced from two years to about four months. Had this court’s decision affirming the sentence been delayed by those four months, Snipes would, under the trial court’s reasoning, have forfeited his post-conviction rights altogether by exercising his right to appeal the life sentence.
The trial court’s order denying Snipes’s postconviction motion as untimely is reversed for consideration of its claims on the merits.
Reversed and remanded.
FULMER and COVINGTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Gisi v. State, 135 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…for further proceedings. Gisi was resentenced on May 5, 2010. Because he did not appeal the new sentence, it became final — and the clock under rule 3.850 began to run — when the thirty-day period for filing an appeal expired. See Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Ross v. State, 947 So. 2d 699, 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); see also Westley v. State, 903 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Davis v. State, 687 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Thus, Gisi had until June 5, 2012, to file a…
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Carlile Breland v. State, 58 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…period in the rule does not commence until both the conviction and the sentence become final, which occurs upon issuance of the mandate in the direct review proceedings. See Pierce v. State, 875 So. 2d 726, 729 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Cook v. State, 596 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Indeed, until the direct appeal is concluded, the trial court is without jurisdiction to consider a rule 3.850 motion. See Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778, 779 (Fla. 1s…
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Ross v. State, 947 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…as untimely filed as the two-year limitations period began to run after the imposition of the new sentence after Ross I. We disagree. In Pierce v. State, 875 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), this court followed the interpretation of Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and concluded “that the two-year window commences when both the conviction and sentence are final.” Id. at 729. To do otherwise would allow for an “absurd result” where a defendant could be absolutely precluded from filing a rule…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Daniels v. State, 712 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1998)
- Snipes v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1999)
- Oliver v. State, 734 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Cannady v. State, 771 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Kimball E. Reese v. State, 771 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)