BRIAN JOSEPH JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred in imposing a condition requiring the defendant to pay for random drug testing and in ordering restitution to the sheriff's office.
The defendant pleaded guilty to driving with a revoked license and resisting law enforcement. The written order of probation included conditions for r…
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KELLY, Judge.
Brian Joseph Jones challenges the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to driving with a revoked license (habitual offender) and resisting law enforcement officers without violence.1 Jones argues that condition (8) of the written order of probation erroneously provides that he submit to random drug testing at his own expense. Although submission to drug and alcohol testing is a general condition of probation which need not be orally pronounced at sentencing, the State concedes that the trial court’s failure to orally pronounce the requirement that Jones bear the cost of such testing was error. See § 948.03(l)(k)(l), Fla. Stat. (2000); Diaz v. State, 691 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We agree and strike that portion of condition (8) requiring Jones to pay for random testing.
Jones also argues that condition (41), requiring payment of $50 in restitution to the Polk County Sheriffs Office, was error. Because the sheriffs office does not qualify as a victim for payment of restitution pursuant to section 775.089(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2000), we strike condition (41). However, because Jones agreed to pay $50 in investigative costs to the sheriffs office as part of his written plea agreement, on remand the trial court may include this assessment as an individual condition of Jones’ probation. See Sims v. State, 746 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Stone v. State, 642 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Reversed and remanded with directions.
SALCINES and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur. . Jones preserved this issue for review by filing a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).
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Citator
Cited By
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Wyon Dale Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…fer to a crime victim was recognized by the Florida Supreme Court more than a century ago in Darby v. State, 41 Fla. 274, 26 So. 315 (1899). The cases on which appellant relies, Lewis v. State, 874 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Jones v. State, 846 So. 2d 662, 662-63 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Sheppard v. State, 753 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); and Sims v. State, 746 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), do not address the issue raised here: whether a county is barred from entitlement to restitution pursuant to sect…1 / 2
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Jackson v. State, 902 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…f the error requires us to strike only that portion of condition 9 that requires payment; it may not be reimposed. See, e.g., Frasilus v. State, 840 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000)); Jones v. State, 846 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Condition 10 of the written probation order requires Jackson to pay $1.00 to First Step, Inc., for each month of supervision, but the payment requirement was not orally pronounced at sentencing and it is not included in the list…
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Albertie v. State, 979 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…ayments it requires from all of its members. Thus, the RIAA falls directly within the category of affected, but non-victim, third parties to which restitution may not be awarded. See Lewis v. State, 874 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Jones v. State, 846 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Sheppard v. State, 753 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Eloshway v. State, 553 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), review denied, 564 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1990). Reversed. . Section 775.089(l)(c) provides: The term "victim” as used in t…
Authorities Cited
- Diaz v. State, 691 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Stone v. State, 642 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Park Ests. Dev. Co., Inc. v. SunTRUST Bank, 746 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Katina Irene Sims v. State, 746 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)