DON G. MASON, APPELLANT,
v.
EVA N. MASON, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges an order partitioning joint property entered after the dissolution of marriage was finalized. The court reversed, holding that once a dissolution order finally adjudicates property rights, the court lacks jurisdiction to subsequently modify those rights absent a specific reservation of jurisdiction for that purpose.
A court lacks jurisdiction to modify or further adjudicate property rights after a dissolution order has finally determined those rights unless the dissolution order contains a specific reservation of jurisdiction for that purpose. A general reservation of jurisdiction is insufficient to preserve the court's authority to subsequently alter property rights that have already been adjudicated in the dissolution order.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in a judgment of dissolution.
[2] Property rights not adjudicated in a dissolution judgment can be determined later if jurisdiction to do so has been expressly reserved for that purpose.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Ordinarily a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in the judgment of dissolution.”
Establishes the basic principle that courts cannot modify property rights after a final dissolution order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties entered into an uncontested dissolution of marriage with an agreed property settlement. The dissolution order directed the wife to divide …
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GRIMES, Chief Judge.
The husband appeals from an order of partition of joint property entered subsequent to an order of dissolution of marriage. Appellant argues that because the order of dissolution was dispositive of the property rights of the parties, the court was without jurisdiction to subsequently modify the disposition of property. We agree and reverse.
After an uncontested petition for dissolution and agreement by the parties for property settlement, the trial court entered the following order:
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the husband and the wife herein are hereby forever dissolved and set aside, and that the said marriage is dissolved a vinculo.
2. That the parties hereto have stipulated in open court that they are the joint owners of certain real, personal and intangible personal property, and that in order to make an equitable division thereof, the Petitioner-Wife, Eva N. Mason, shall within two (2) weeks from the date of this order make two (2) separate lists of said jointly owned property, dividing the property in a manner which she considers to be fair and equitable, and the Respondent-Husband shall have the choice of which list he shall receive. The Respondent-Husband shall make his determination within two (2) weeks after his receipt of said lists, and each party shall immediately thereafter execute any and all necessary documents to convey to the other party all their right, title, and interest therein.
3. That the Respondent-Husband shall, upon receipt of this order, return to the Petitioner-Wife, the Captain’s Chair which he removed from her residence.
4. That this court does hereby retain jurisdiction of this cause and the parties hereto.
Two weeks later the husband filed an objection to the wife’s filing of three property lists rather than the two lists referred to in the order. The wife than obtained permission to file an amended complaint in which she prayed for partition of the jointly owned property. The husband moved to dismiss contending that the order of dissolution precluded further action in the matter. The court denied the motion to dismiss and entered a judgment directing partition of the jointly owned real and personal property.
Ordinarily a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in the judgment of dissolution. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d 423 (1948); Simon v. Simon, 293 So. 2d 780 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). Property rights not adjudicated on dissolution can be determined later when jurisdiction to do so has been reserved. Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla.1976); Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), cert. discharged 329 So. 2d 299 (1976); Seale v. Seale, 350 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). However, the reservation of jurisdiction contemplated by the foregoing cases is a specific reservation for the purpose of making a later adjudication of property rights.
The general reservation of jurisdiction contained in the dissolution order entered below was insufficient to preserve the court’s jurisdiction to subsequently alter the property rights. The dissolution order was self-executing, directing the parties to convey joint property under an orderly procedure. No further judicial labor was required or contemplated other than enforcement, should such become necessary. See S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97 (Fla.1974).
The order of dissolution was a final judgment determining the property rights of the parties. The court was without jurisdiction to enter a later contradictory judgment directing partition.
REVERSED.
SCHEB and RYDER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…erty rights of the parties. Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Generally, a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in the judgment of dissolution. Mason v. Mason, 371 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Pruitt [*1019] v. Pruitt, 370 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Property rights not adjudicated on dissolution can be determined at a later time if jurisdiction to do so has been specifically retained, Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2…1 / 3
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Harman v. Harman, 523 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…ation of jurisdiction for the purpose of making a later adjudication of property rights, the court does not have jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in a judgment of dissolution. Mason v. Mason, 371 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The trial court’s general reservation of jurisdiction in the instant case was “insufficient to preserve the court’s jurisdiction to subsequently alter the property rights.” Id. The trial court erred in awarding the husband’s int…
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Covin v. Covin, 403 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…erty rights of the parties. Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Generally, a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in the judgment of dissolution. Mason v. Mason, 371 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 370 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Property rights not adjudicated on dissolution can be determined at a later time if jurisdiction to do so has been specifically retained, Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (F…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v. Wilmott Webb, 304 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1974)
- Roslyn S. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935 (Fla. 1948)
- Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Simon v. Simon, 293 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Lenora Jackson v. State, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)
- Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)
- State v. Phillip, 329 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1976)
- Seale v. Lottie Jean Seale, 350 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)