JASON D. LANGLEY, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jason Langley appeals his conviction for trafficking in phenethylamine and a three-year mandatory minimum sentence. The court affirms both the denial of his suppression motion and the sentence, but preserves his right to challenge the mandatory minimum term through a Rule 3.850 postconviction motion without prejudice.
The court affirms the sentence and the denial of the suppression motion, but without prejudice to Langley filing a facially sufficient Rule 3.850 postconviction motion to challenge the mandatory minimum term. The sentence is not reversed at this stage because it resulted from a negotiated plea.
[1] A defendant's conviction and sentence resulting from a negotiated plea agreement will be affirmed, even if the sentence includes a minimum mandatory term not explicitly s…
[2] A defendant may pursue postconviction relief challenging the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence when the sentence was the result of a negotiated plea.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We decline to strike the minimum mandatory term at this time because Mr. Langley's sentence was the result of a negotiated plea. A reversal of this sentence would provide the State with an opportunity to withdraw from the plea and proceed to trial.”
Explains the court's rationale for not reversing the mandatory minimum on direct appeal when the sentence was part of a negotiated plea agreement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLangley was charged with trafficking in phenethylamine. He entered a negotiated plea of no contest in exchange for a three-year sentence after the cir…
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PER CURIAM.
Jason D. Langley appeals his conviction for trafficking in phenethylamine and the three-year sentence imposed for the offense. After the circuit court denied Mr. Langley’s dispositive motion to suppress evidence, Mr. Langley entered a negotiated plea of no contest to this charge in exchange for a sentence of three years’ imprisonment. We affirm without comment the denial of Mr. Langley’s motion to suppress. Although we affirm Mr. Langley’s sentence, this affirmance is without prejudice to his filing a facially sufficient motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 challenging the imposition of a three-year minimum mandatory term in this case.
The trial court imposed a three-year minimum mandatory sentence, even though the written plea agreement does not contain reference to a minimum mandatory term.
On appeal, Mr. Langley argues that his sentence must be reversed based on our opinion in Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 821 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2002) (holding chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, which required mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain drug offenses, is unconstitutional because it violates single-subject rule of Florida Constitution); see also Green v. State, 839 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that reenactment of sentencing provisions of chapter 99-188 cannot be applied retroactively because this would violate Ex Post Facto Clauses of United States and Florida Constitutions). Mr. Langley did not preserve this issue for review either at sentencing or by filing a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).
We decline to strike the minimum mandatory term at this time because Mr. Langley’s sentence was the result of a negotiated plea. A reversal of this sentence would provide the State with an opportunity to withdraw from the plea and proceed to trial. See Casey v. State, 788 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed but without prejudice to Mr. Langley’s right to file a facially sufficient motion for postcon- viction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, if he determines that this is in his best interest. See Karo v. State, 849 So. 2d 351, 2003 WL 2003719 (Fla. 2d DCA May 2, 2003) (explaining that facially sufficient claim for relief pursuant to Taylor requires alleging date of offense and that amendments held unconstitutional in Taylor affected statute under which sentence was imposed); Casey, 788 So. 2d at 1122 (explaining that when improper sentence is result of negotiated plea, relief must be sought pursuant to rule 3.850 because evidentiary hearing is required to determine whether state gave up something in negotiated plea and would therefore be entitled to withdraw from plea if sentence was corrected).
Affirmed.
ALTENBERND, C.J., and SALCINES and VILLANTI, JJ., concur.
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Artavis Dawkins v. State, 923 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ions of punishment for an offense are impermissible as a matter of law. We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing. However, the State should also be allowed, if it chooses, to withdraw its assent to the plea agreement. See Langley v. State, 848 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Reversed and remanded. FULMER, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.…
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Rydberg v. State, 891 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…2d 1015 (Fla.1999). Nevertheless, this court continues to review cases like this one where unpreserved sentencing errors, some with apparent merit, are argued on appeal. See, e.g., Shea v. State, 884 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Langley v. State, 848 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). This is a waste of the attorney’s time and the court’s resources. It may constitute ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and it leaves the defendant to his own resources to seek a pro se postconviction motion to correct w…
Authorities Cited
- Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Green v. State, 839 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Casey v. State, 788 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Karo v. State, 849 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)