RONALD GASPARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ronald Gaspard was convicted of aggravated stalking after violating a domestic violence injunction. The court reversed his conviction, holding that knowledge of the injunction's existence is an essential element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury, and the trial court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the jury on this element.
Knowledge by the accused that an injunction is in effect is an essential element of aggravated stalking. The trial court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the jury on this essential element, regardless of whether the instruction was requested.
[1] Knowledge by an accused that an injunction is in effect is an essential element of the offense of aggravated stalking after entry of a domestic violence injunction.
[2] A trial court commits fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the charged offense, even if a proper instruction was not requested.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statutory elements of aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4) are knowledge of an injunction, and knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing the beneficiary of the injunction.”
Establishes that knowledge of the injunction is an essential statutory element of the offense, not merely a circumstantial fact.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGaspard was charged with aggravated stalking under Florida Statute § 784.048(4) for following or harassing a person protected by a domestic violence i…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Aggravated Stalking cases and more on FLexlaw
ALLEN, C.J.
The appellant in this direct criminal appeal challenges his conviction of aggravated stalking after entry of a domestic violence injunction. He presented evidence at trial that he did not know that the injunction was in effect at the time of the alleged offense, and he argues on appeal that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the jury that an element of the offense is knowledge by the accused that an injunction or other specified court order is in effect. Concluding that such knowledge is an element of the offense and that the trial court fundamentally erred in failing to so instruct the jury, we reverse the appellant’s conviction.
Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for any person under injunction for protection of another person against domestic violence to willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass such other person. Violation of the statute constitutes a felony of the third degree. The mens rea requirement specified in the statute relates only to the following or harassing element of the offense, and thus the statute is silent as to whether knowledge of the injunction is also an essential element. But the supreme court, in applying a double jeopardy analysis pursuant to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), has concluded that “[t]he statutory elements of aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4) are knowledge of an injunction, and knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing the beneficiary of the injunction.” State v. Johnson, 676 So. 2d 408 (Fla.1996) (Emphasis supplied).
We note that this recitation of the statutory elements is consistent with the principles expressed by the supreme court in Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1996). See also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994).
Because knowledge by an accused that an injunction is in effect is an essential element of the offense, the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury. Although a proper instruction was not requested, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to this essential element of the offense constituted fundamental error in this case. See State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1991). The appellant’s conviction is accordingly reversed, and this case is remanded.
BENTON and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jude Cazeau v. State, 873 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…t of the motion for judgment of acquittal and in closing, defense counsel made Cazeau’s knowledge of the injunction a disputed issue at trial. Thus, we are compelled to reverse his conviction and remand for a [*530] new trial.2 See Gaspard v. State, 848 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA) (reversing aggravated stalking conviction where jury was not instructed that defendant’s knowledge of injunction was an element of the crime and this issue was disputed at trial), supplemented on reh’g, 845 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 20…
-
Hall v. State, 181 So. 3d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…n, the State was required to prove that Mr. Hall acted “willfully” in violating the injunction. § 741.31(4)(a)(3). In this context, “willfully” means “knowingly, intentionally and purposely.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.18; cf. Gaspard v. State, 848 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding that knowledge by an accused that an injunction is in effect is an essential element of the crime of aggravated stalking after the entry of a domestic violence injunction). It was undisputed at trial that the victi…
Authorities Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932)
- D'Angelo v. State, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Batraville Vincent Delva, 575 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1991)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (U.S. 1994)
- Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996)
- State v. Johnson, 676 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1996)