BLENDING HUGHES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida appellate court reversed a habitual felony offender sentence imposed on Hughes, who pled no contest to armed robbery, because both predicate offenses used to enhance his sentence were drug-related crimes under section 893.13, making him statutorily ineligible for habitualization under Florida law.
Both of Hughes's predicate convictions violated section 893.13 relating to purchase or possession of controlled substances, rendering him statutorily ineligible for habitualization. The court reversed the enhanced sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the trial court to offer the state the choice to permit resentencing without habitual offender status or withdraw from the plea agreement.
[1] A defendant cannot be sentenced as a habitual felony offender if the felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the two prior felony convictions, is a…
[2] An offense prohibiting the acquisition or obtaining of a controlled substance by fraud is a violation of statutes relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled s…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under section 775.084(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1999), a defendant cannot be habitualized unless "[t]he felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the two prior felony convictions, is not a violation of s. 893.13 relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance."”
Establishes the statutory requirement for habitualization eligibility, namely that at least one predicate offense must not be drug-related.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHughes pled no contest to armed robbery and was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to ten years' imprisonment plus three years' probation. The tr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion For Resentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s order summarily denying his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Appellant pled no contest to armed robbery and was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to ten years’ imprisonment followed by three years’ probation. The court relied upon appellant’s prior convictions for possession of cocaine and obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud as predicate offenses to impose the habitual offender sentence. Under section 775.084(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1999), a defendant cannot be habitualized unless “[t]he felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the two prior felony convictions, is not a violation of s. 893.13 relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance.”
In 1994, appellant was separately convicted of possession of cocaine and of violating section 893.13(3)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1991) which states that:
(3)(a) It is unlawful for any person:
1. To acquire or obtain, or attempt to acquire or obtain, possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge.
(Emphasis added). The state apparently concedes appellant’s conviction for posses sion of cocaine is a violation of s. 893.13 relating to the purchase and possession of a controlled substance. The state argues, however, the appellant may still be sentenced as a habitual felony offender because appellant’s conviction for obtaining possession of a controlled substance by fraud is not an offense relating to the purchase and possession of a controlled substance. We disagree.
The statute prohibiting a person from acquiring or obtaining a controlled substance by fraud requires an intent to possess a controlled substance. It is therefore, on its face, a violation of s. 893.13 relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance. Because both of the predicate crimes relied upon by the court in sentencing appellant are offenses relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance, appellant did not qualify for an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender statute. See Woods v. State, 807 So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Because the appellant was improperly habitualized, we reverse and remand to the trial court for resentencing. If, however, the appellant’s plea was predicated upon habitualization, the trial court must permit the state to either (i) allow appellant to be resenteneed without imposition of habitual offender status, or (ii) withdraw from the plea agreement and proceed to trial. See Wade v. State, 822 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Lee v. State, 642 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
KAHN, WEBSTER and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Ransom Louis Collins, 985 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2008)…rated offenses); Prudent v. State, 867 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (resentencing ordered where State failed to establish that defendant was the same person who was convicted of the predicate felonies used to support the sentence); Hughes v. State, 850 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (resentencing ordered where State failed to prove proper predicate felonies as enumerated in section 775.084, Florida Statutes); Walker v. State, 842 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (resentencing ordered where State failed to prov…
-
Rosalind Virgil v. State, 884 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…each case. If, in the above three cases, Virgil entered negotiated pleas to habitual sentences, the trial court must permit the State either to agree to resentencing or to withdraw from the plea agreement and proceed to trial. See Hughes v. State, 850 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Affirmed but remanded to the trial court for correction of sentences. ALTENBERND, C.J., and WALLACE, J., Concur. . Both the 1993 version of the statute, applicable to circuit court case number 95-4623, and the 1995 version of…
-
Chantz Harper v. State, 889 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…at the time of the offense. However, if he entered into a negotiated plea, the circuit court must permit the State either to agree to resentencing under the guidelines or to withdraw from the plea agreement and proceed to trial. See Hughes v. State, 850 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. CANADY and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur. . We note that Harper also contends that imposing a fine in addition to a habitual offender sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by statute.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lexington Ins. Co. v. Ramdas and Chitra Bhandari, 807 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
- LEE v. State, 642 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Woods v. State, 807 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Wade v. State, 822 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)