RITA L. BAILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL B. BAILEY, APPELLEE
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Rita Bailey appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the trial court's failure to provide written findings supporting an inequitable distribution of marital assets and its imposition of child support arrearages without a prior court order. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the equitable distribution and arrearage awards while affirming other aspects of the dissolution judgment.
The court reversed the equitable distribution award due to lack of written findings as required by Florida Statute section 61.075(1). The joint IRS debt was properly characterized as liability for which both parties are jointly responsible. The child support arrearage award was vacated because it was imposed without a prior court order, though on remand the trial court may order retroactive child support based on the former wife's ability to pay.
[1] A trial court must make written findings to support a disproportionate distribution of marital assets.
[2] A trial court's failure to specify responsibility for a joint IRS debt in a final judgment is not an error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if a court's distribution of the marital assets is disproportionate, then the court must make written findings in support of its distribution”
Establishes the requirement for written findings when distributing marital assets inequitably under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRita Bailey and Michael Bailey dissolved their marriage. The trial court awarded all limited marital assets to the former husband without written find…
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GREEN, J.
The former wife appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and contends that the lower court failed to equitably distribute the parties’ marital assets and liabilities. Moreover, the wife also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to pay child support arrearages where there was not a court order of support in place prior to the final judgment. Upon review, we reverse and vacate both the equitable distribution award of the marital assets and child support arrearage award, and remand this cause for further findings by the trial court.
Although the trial court listed the limited marital assets of the parties in the final judgment and awarded them all to the former husband, it failed to make any written findings in support of its inequitable distribution. In accordance with section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes (2001), if a court’s distribution of the marital assets is disproportionate, then the court must make written findings in support of its distribution. See Taber v. Taber, 626 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
Furthermore, the former wife takes issue with the trial court’s failure to specify which of the parties was to be responsible for their $1500 IRS debt. The final judgment, however, specified that this was a “joint IRS debt.” We construe this to mean that this is a debt for which both parties are liable and therefore find no error under section 61.075.
Finally, the former wife argues that the trial court erred in imposing a $15,729.55 child support arrearage award against her and in favor of the former husband,1 where there was never a temporary order for child support entered against her by the court prior to the dissolution judgment. To the extent the court referred to the past child support in the final judgment as an arrearage rather than retroactive child support, we agree. The distinction between the two is significant as noted by the Fourth District in Milopoulos v. Milopoulos, 691 So. 2d 1199, 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997):
Unpaid child support accruing from an order requiring payment, an arrearage, is a vested right, not subject to modification. Making a present award of child support retroactive, however, is discretionary with the trial court. Evidence of ability to pay at the time the petition for modification is filed is necessary, (citations omitted).
Where, as here, the court never ordered the former wife to pay child support prior to the dissolution judgment, we vacate the arrearage award imposed against her for back child support. Upon remand, however, the trial court has the discretion to make the former wife pay child support retroactive to the date of the parties’ separation,2 based upon her ability to pay. See Id.; Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse and vacate the equitable distribution award of the parties marital assets as well as the child support arrearage award, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the final judgment of dissolution.
Reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part.
. He is the residential custodian of the parties' minor child.
. The former husband concedes that this would be May 2001 rather than August 1999 as found by the lower court.
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Guobaitis v. Sherrer, 18 So. 3d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…f fact’ including ‘findings necessary to advise the parties or the reviewing court of the trial court’s rationale for the distribution of marital assets and allocation of liabilities’ ” (quoting § 61.075(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003))); Bailey v. Bailey, 851 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[I]f a court’s distribution of the marital assets is disproportionate, then the court must make written findings in support of its distribution.”); Maddox v. Maddox, 750 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“A trial court m…
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Neli Montalvo v. Montalvo, 949 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…g factors in Florida Statutes section 61.075 (2006), and explaining reasons for the unequal distribution. See, e.g., Boutwell v. Adams, 920 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Peacock v. Peacock, 879 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Bailey v. Bailey, 851 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). On remand, the trial court must reconsider the distribution scheme and either effect an equal distribution or make findings necessary to support unequal distribution. Additionally, we note that the trial court may consider t…
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Mathieu v. Dep't of Revenue (Fla. 3d DCA 2026)
Authorities Cited
- Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Taber v. Taber, 626 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Milopoulos v. Milopoulos, 691 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)