TYRONE J. SKEENS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Tyrone Skeens appeals the dismissal of his postconviction relief motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 as untimely. The court reverses, holding that the two-year filing deadline does not begin until the direct appeal process concludes, and remands for consideration of the motion on its merits.
The two-year limitation period for Rule 3.850 motions does not begin until the direct appeal process has concluded. For Skeens, whose conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and who did not appeal his second resentencing, the judgment became final on December 13, 2000, when the thirty-day appeal period expired. Therefore, Skeens had until December 13, 2002 to file his motion, and his October 21, 2002 filing was timely.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief is timely if filed within two years of the conclusion of the direct appeal process.
[2] The direct appeal process concludes when the time for filing a direct appeal from the final resentencing expires.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1996, Skeens was convicted of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under sixteen, sentenced to fifteen years concurrent. After…
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PER CURIAM.
Tyrone J. Skeens appeals the trial court’s dismissal for untimefiness of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse and remand for the trial court to consider Skeens’ motion on the merits.
In 1996, Skeens was convicted by a jury of one count of sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious act upon a child under sixteen. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison on each count to run concurrently. Skeens appealed and this court in Skeens v. State, 733 So. 2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (Skeens I), affirmed the sexual battery conviction, reversed the lewd and lascivious conviction, and remanded for resentencing.
In 1999, Skeens was resentenced under the 1995 sentencing guidelines to thirteen years in prison for the sexual battery. Skeens again appealed and this court in Skeens v. State, 779 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (Skeens II), remanded the case back to the sentencing court for reconsideration in fight of Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000).
In 2000, Skeens was resentenced under the 1994 sentencing guidelines to nine years in prison for the sexual battery. He did not appeal this sentence. On October 21, 2002, Skeens filed a rule 3.850 motion which the trial court dismissed as untimely. The trial court ruled that the sexual battery conviction became final upon the issuance of this court’s mandate for Skeens I in 1999. The trial court also ruled that the sexual battery conviction could no longer be challenged by a rule 3.850 motion filed in 2002. However, this court in Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), has recently held that the two-year time limitation of rule 3.850(b) cannot begin to run until the direct appeal process has concluded. We note that the Snipes opinion was not available to the trial court when it made its rulings in this case.
For Skeens, since his conviction was affirmed by his initial direct appeal (Skeens I) and he did not appeal the sentence imposed after his second direct appeal (Skeens II), the direct appeal process ended and his judgment and sentence became final on December 13, 2000, when the time expired for the filing of a direct appeal from his second resentencing. See McGee v. State, 684 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that a judgment and sentence which are not appealed become final when “the thirty-day period for taking an appeal has expired”).
Accordingly, Skeens had until December 13, 2002, to file a timely rule 3.850 motion. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). Skeens filed his motion with the circuit court on October 21, 2002. Skeens’ rule 3.850 motion was timely. The order of the trial court dismissing Skeens’ rule 3.850 motion as untimely is reversed and this case is remanded for the trial court to consider the motion on its merits.
Reversed and remanded.
SALCINES, STRINGER, and COVINGTON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Denizard v. State, 157 So. 3d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…3, 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“Gisi was resentenced on May 5, 2010. Because he did not appeal the new sentence, it became final — and the clock under rule 3.850 began to run — when the thirty-day period for filing an appeal expired.”); Skeens v. State, 853 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“For Skeens, since his conviction was affirmed by his initial direct appeal (Skeens I) and he did not appeal the sentence imposed after his second direct appeal (Skeens II), the direct appeal process ended and his judgment a…
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Gland v. State, 239 So. 3d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)
Authorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- McGEE v. State, 684 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Skeens v. State, 733 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Skeens v. State, 779 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)