FELIX CORDOVA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Cordova appealed an order denying his motion for additional jail time credit. The court held that Cordova is entitled to credit only for time actually incarcerated before and after sentencing, not time spent free on bond, and affirmed the order without prejudice to exhaust administrative remedies within the Department of Corrections.
A defendant is entitled to credit only for time actually incarcerated in jail prior to sentencing and between sentencing and delivery to the Department of Corrections. Time spent free on bond does not qualify for credit under Florida Statute § 921.161.
[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for time incarcerated prior to sentencing, but not for time free on bond prior to sentencing.
[2] A defendant is entitled to credit for time incarcerated between sentencing and delivery to the Department of Corrections, excluding periods at liberty on bond or otherwis…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Defendant-appellant Cordova is entitled to credit only for the time incarcerated prior to sentencing, not (as he incorrectly argues) credit for time free on bond prior to sentencing.”
Establishes the core holding that bond time does not count toward sentencing credit
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCordova was convicted and sought additional credit for time served. He argued he was entitled to credit for time he spent free on bond both before sen…
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PER CURIAM.
Felix Cordova appeals an order denying his motion for additional credit for time served. Based on the information presented in the motion, we find no error in the calculation of the credit for jail time served prior to sentencing. Defendant-appellant Cordova is entitled to credit only for the time incarcerated prior to sentencing, not (as he incorrectly argues) credit for time free on bond prior to sentencing. See § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2001).
Regarding the question of credit for time served subsequent to sentencing, we affirm the order without prejudice to the defendant to exhaust his administrative remedies within the Department of Corrections. See Grant v. State, 837 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Lucio v. State, 673 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
To the extent that defendant may be claiming to have exhausted his administrative remedies, we affirm without prejudice to defendant filing a petition for mandamus and attaching thereto documentation from the Department of Corrections reflecting the postsentencing credit awarded and the Department’s ruling on his inmate grievance. Lucio.
The defendant argues that he is entitled to credit for the entire time period between sentencing and his delivery to the Department of Corrections, including time he was free on postjudgment release. He derives that interpretation from the word ing of subsection 921.161(2), Florida Statutes (2001), which requires the jailer to certify several postjudgment time periods, including any periods after sentence that the prisoner was at liberty on bond. Id. § 921.161(2)(b); see State v. Peters, 526 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).*
In reality, “time spent” under subsection 921.161(2) refers back to a similar phrase used in subsection 921.161(1) and means time spent in custody. See id. § 921.161(1) (“time she or he spent in the county jañ”). The jailer is required to certify the dates that the defendant was at liberty on bond or otherwise, id. § 921.161(2)(b), (c), so that these periods can be subtracted from the total time period between sentencing and delivery to the Department of Corrections. The defendant is only entitled to credit for the time incarcerated between sentencing and delivery to the Department of Corrections.
Affirmed.
*
Subsection 921.161(2), Florida Statutes, states:
(2) In addition to other credits, a person sentenced to imprisonment in custody of the Department of Corrections shall receive credit on her or his sentence for all time spent between sentencing and being placed in custody of the department. When delivering a prisoner to the department, the custodian of the local jail shall certify to it in writing:
(a)The date the sentence was imposed and the date the prisoner was delivered to the department.
(b) The dates of any periods after sentence the prisoner was at liberty on bond.
(c) The dates and reasons for any other times the prisoner was at liberty after sentence.
(d) The offender-based transaction system number or numbers from the uniform arrest report or reports established pursuant to s. 943.05(2).
The certificate shall be prima facie evidence of the facts certified.
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State v. Mendiola, 919 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…length or conditions of a defendant’s incarceration as to matters which arise after the sentence has begun; only the Department of Corrections has that authority. See Leiffer v. State, 867 So. 2d 538, 538 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Cordova v. State, 855 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Bostrom v. State, 732 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Reynolds, 590 So. 2d at 1044. But see Hester, 730 So. 2d at 748; Jones, 676 So. 2d at 84; Carson, 489 So. 2d at 1238. Although it is ordinarily preferable to avoid legal “ch…
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Ilkhani v. Al Lamberti, 50 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…(b) The dates of any periods after sentence the prisoner was at liberty on bond. (c) The dates and reasons for any other times the prisoner was at liberty after sentence. § 921.161(2)(a-c), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). In Cordova v. State, 855 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), the court explained: In reality, “time spent” under subsection 921.161(2) refers back to a similar phrase used in subsection 921.161(1) and means time spent in custody. See id. § 921.161(1) (“time she or he spent in the county j…
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Borroto v. State, 943 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ive remedies, if Borroto is unsatisfied with the outcome, he may seek judicial relief by filing a petition for writ of mandamus under the 1982 case number, with the Second Judicial Circuit Court in and for Leon County, Florida. See Cordova v. State, 855 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(holding that defendant seeking credit for time served must exhaust administrative remedies within the Department of Corrections prior to seeking judicial relief); Barber v. State, 661 So. 2d 355, 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(holdin…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cleveland Grant v. State, 837 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Cameron v. State, 673 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Fla. Nat'l Bank v. Flagship Bank OF Jacksonville, 526 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)