KAREN JEAN PILCHER IRWIN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
MICHAEL THEODORE IRWIN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this divorce case, the Florida Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's enforcement of a prenuptial agreement that effectively barred Mrs. Irwin from any share of marital property. The court held that while prenuptial waivers are enforceable, they do not bar claims to marital assets purchased with marital earnings or to enhanced values of separate property resulting from marital contributions.
The prenuptial agreement's waiver provisions were overbroad in application. Although the agreement validly waived Mrs. Irwin's general marital rights, it did not specifically reserve Mr. Irwin's marital earnings as separate property, and therefore did not exclude Mrs. Irwin's claim to share in assets purchased with those earnings. Additionally, the agreement did not waive her claim to her rightful share of the enhanced value of Mr. Irwin's separate property resulting from marital contributions.
[1] A judgment is not final or appealable if it does not finally determine the amounts of suit money and costs.
[2] A prenuptial agreement does not exclude a spouse's claim to share in the value of assets purchased with marital earnings unless the agreement specifically reserves those…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The agreement did not specifically reserve Mr. Irwin's marital earnings as his separate property, and thus did not exclude Mrs. Irwin's claim to share in the value of assets purchased with those earnings.”
Establishes that prenuptial waivers do not bar claims to marital assets purchased with marital earnings absent specific language reserving such earnings as separate property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKaren and Ted Irwin were married for ten years. They executed a prenuptial agreement that included a broad waiver of Mrs. Irwin's rights in Ted Irwin'…
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NORTHCUTT, Judge.
The circuit court upheld the prenuptial agreement between Karen and Ted Irwin and entered a final judgment dissolving their ten-year marriage. Mrs. Irwin contends the court should not have enforced the prenuptial agreement and that, having done so, the court misapplied its provisions when dividing the parties’ assets. She also maintains that the child support award was skewed by the improper imputation of income to her and the erroneous failure to impute income to Mr. Irwin.
On cross-appeal, Mr. Irwin disputes the court’s determination that Mrs. Irwin was owed reimbursement for the cost of home improvements and its award of suit money and costs to her. We decline to address the suit money and costs awards because the court did not finally determine their amounts. As such, this aspect of the final judgment is not final or appealable. See Doig v. Doig, 787 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372, 1376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
We affirm without further discussion on the remaining issues, save for the property distribution, which we reverse in part.
The Irwins’ prenuptial agreement contained the following provisions:
1. RELEASE OF MARITAL RIGHTS: [Mrs. Irwin] hereby waives and releases all rights in the property and estate of Ted Irwin, including, but not limited to, support or alimony for herself upon dissolution of marriage ... which she may acquire by reason of her marriage to Ted Irwin. The foregoing shall apply to any property owned by Ted Irwin' at any time, whether such property is acquired or held prior to or during the marriage, and whether held in his name alone or in both of their names, jointly or as tenants in common, or whether held in any such manner by him or his estate upon his death.
5. TRANSFERS BETWEEN THE PARTIES: Notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement, any other rights acquired by [Mrs. Irwin] by virtue of any transfer or conveyance of property by Ted Irwin to her during his lifetime, or by will upon his death, shall not be limited or restricted in any way.
The circuit court discerned that, as a consequence of these provisions, there was no marital property to divide. It ordered that Mrs. Irwin was to retain all property titled solely in her name, and that Mr. Irwin was entitled to all property titled solely in his name or jointly with Mrs. Irwin. This was error stemming from an overbroad application of the waivers contained in the agreement. The agreement did not specifically reserve Mr. Irwin’s marital earnings as his separate property, and thus did not exclude Mrs. Irwin’s claim to share in the value of assets pur chased with those earnings. See Worley v. Worley, 2003 WL 21817921, 855 So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Witowski v. Witowski 758 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Nor did the agreement waive Mrs. Irwin’s claim to her rightful share of the marital asset consisting of the enhanced value of Mr. Irwin’s separate property that resulted from the contribution of marital funds or labor. Worley; Witowski.
Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions to revisit the property division with these principles in mind.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
STRINGER, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.
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Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983 (Fla. 2015)…J. We review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 133 So. 3d 1008, 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), in which the Fourth District certified conflict with the decisions of the Second District in Irwin v. Irwin, 857 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and the Third District in Valdes v. Valdes, 894 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Additionally, the Fourth District ruled upon the following question, which it certified to be of great public importance: Where a prenuptial agreemen…1 / 2
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Valdes v. Ibis Morejon Valdes, 894 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…lorida Statutes which provides that increases in value of a non-marital asset that are attributable to marital labor or funds are subject to equitable distribution. Doig, 787 So. 2d at 103; see also § 61.075, Fla. Stat. Similarly, in Irwin v. Irwin, 857 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), the Second District reversed a Final Judgment of Dissolution, finding that “[t]he agreement did not specifically reserve Mr. Irwin’s marital earnings as hiá separate property, and thus did not exclude Mrs. Irwin’s claim to share…
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Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 133 So. 3d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…uiring same. Id. Moreover, the Second District has held that if a prenuptial agreement does not specifically designate a spouse’s earnings as separate property, the assets acquired with those earnings will be treated as marital. See Irwin v. Irwin, 857 So. 2d 247, 248-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“The [prenuptial] agreement did not specifically reserve Mr. Irwin’s marital earnings as his separate property, and thus did not exclude Mrs. Irwin’s claim to share in the value of assets purchased with those earnings. No…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Doig v. Richelle Doig, 787 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Church OF GOD IN Christ, Inc. v. Bd. OF Trs., 758 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Witowski v. Witowski, 758 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Worley v. Worley, 855 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)