REGINALD HENRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2003-10-22
No. 2D02-182
CASANUEVA and CANADY, JJ., Concur.
857 So. 2d 344 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Reginald Henry appealed his convictions for multiple offenses arising from an attack on correctional officers. The court affirmed his convictions but reversed the prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentences, finding that the statutory amendment under which he was sentenced violated the single subject rule and did not apply retroactively.


Holding

The court affirmed that attempted second-degree murder with a weapon is properly classified as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1), and that aggravated battery was properly reclassified based on the victim being a law enforcement officer. However, the court reversed the PRR sentences because the statute was unconstitutionally enacted in violation of the single subject rule and did not apply retroactively to defendants whose offenses fell within the window period.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction for attempted second-degree murder can be reclassified as a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon, even if the weapon was not an element of the un…

[2] A scrivener's error in a written judgment regarding the felony classification of a conviction must be corrected on remand.

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Key Quotes

“Section 775.087(1) precludes reclassification when the use of a weapon was an essential element of the offense.”

Establishes the legal test for when weapon-based reclassification is impermissible

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Facts & Procedural History

On March 24, 2000, Reginald Henry attacked several correctional officers. He was convicted of attempted second-degree murder with a deadly weapon, agg…

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Opinion of the Court
FULMER, Judge.

FULMER, Judge.

Reginald Henry appeals his convictions and sentences for multiple offenses arising from his attack on several correctional officers on March 24, 2000. We affirm Henry’s convictions, with the correction of a scrivener’s error, but we reverse the pris on releasee reoffender sentences and remand for resentencing.

Henry was convicted and sentenced as follows: for attempted second-degree murder with a deadly weapon, a first-degree felony under sections 782.04(2), 777.04, and 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1999), thirty years in prison as a prison releasee reof-fender (PRR); for aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer, a first-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), thirty years as a PRR; for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, a second-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(e), fifteen years as a PRR; for battery on a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(b), five years; and for possession of contraband in a state correctional facility, a second-degree felony under section 944.47(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), five years. All sentences were concurrent.

Henry argues that the trial court erred by reclassifying his conviction for attempted second-degree murder from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon. Section 775.087(1) precludes reclassification when the use of a weapon was an essential element of the offense. Henry argues that the use of a weapon is an essential element of the crime charged because it was alleged in the information. This argument overlooks the fact that the use of a weapon was not an element until section 775.087 was triggered. Nothing in the pertinent statutes for attempted second-degree murder refers to the use of a weapon as an element of the offense. See § 782.04(2) (defining second-degree murder); § 777.04 (defining attempt); see also Goutier v. State, 692 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (affirming classification of attempted second-degree murder with a weapon as a first-degree felony).

Although the attempted second-degree murder conviction was properly treated as a first-degree felony, the written judgment incorrectly noted it as a second-degree felony. On remand, this scrivener’s error should be corrected.

Henry makes essentially the same argument regarding reclassification of his conviction for aggravated battery from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon. But Henry overlooks the fact that this offense was not reclassified based on the use of a weapon; it was reclassified based on the fact that the victim was a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(2)(d).

Henry next argues, and we agree, that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a PRR under the amendment to section 775.082(9)(a)(2), which made the statute applicable to a defendant who commits an offense while serving a prison sentence. As Henry argues, this court held that chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, was an unconstitutional violation of the single subject rule, Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 821 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2002), and that the reenacted provisions do not apply retroactively, Green v. State, 839 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Henry’s sentences were affected by the amendments. See ch. 99-188, § 2. His offense fell within the window period. See Green, 839 So. 2d at 750 n. 1. And he has preserved the issue for appeal. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2). Therefore, we reverse the PRR sentences for attempted second-degree murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault.

As to Taylor, we certify conflict with State v. Franklin, 836 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), review granted, No. SC03-413, 854 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Sept. 19, 2003). As to Green, we certify conflict with Hersey v. State, 831 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), and Carlson v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2162, - So. 2d -, 2002 WL 31202145 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for resentencing; conflicts certified.

CASANUEVA and CANADY, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Raynard Wilson v. State, 898 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
    …offense is committed with a firearm, the crime is re-classified to a first-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(l)(b), subject to an enhanced sentence not to exceed 30 years. See Miller v. State, 460 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 857 So. 2d 344, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony, properly reclassified as a first-degree felony based on use of a weapon); Badia v. State, 770 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Goutier v. State, 692 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2d…

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