WILLIAM RINDERER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing there was a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written sentencing order regarding a mandatory minimum term. The court reversed and remanded, holding that while such discrepancies are properly raised under Rule 3.850 rather than Rule 3.800(a), the defendant's motion was timely and facially sufficient to warrant consideration.
A claimed discrepancy between a written sentencing order and oral pronouncement must be raised under Rule 3.850, not Rule 3.800(a). The defendant's motion, though mislabeled, was timely and facially sufficient under Rule 3.850. A defendant's status as a habitual violent felony offender does not automatically carry a mandatory minimum sentence, as courts retain discretion on whether to impose such a term.
[1] A discrepancy between a written sentencing order and a court's oral pronouncement of sentence is cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, not Rule 3.800…
[2] When a discrepancy exists between a written sentence and an oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when there is a discrepancy between the written sentence and the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails”
Establishes the fundamental rule governing conflicts between written and oral sentences
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court sentenced the defendant as a habitual violent felony offender but did not orally impose a mandatory minimum term. The defendant filed …
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.800(a). In his motion, he requested the court to conform the written sentencing order to its oral pronouncement of sentence. To his motion, he attached a transcript of his sentencing hearing that revealed that the court did not orally impose a mandatory minimum term. The trial court denied the motion. We reverse and remand.
We agree that a claimed discrepancy between a written sentencing order and the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence is not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. It must be alleged in a timely motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Campbell v. State, 718 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) citing Gardner v. State, 707 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). However, the instant motion was sworn and filed within two years of the mandate’s issuance in the direct appeal and thus complied with the requirements of rule 3.850.
The general rule is that when there is a discrepancy between the written sentence and the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails. See, e.g., Broomfield v. State, 698 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The State argues that there was no discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the 'written sentencing order because the trial court orally pronounced the defendant’s sentence as a habitual violent felony offender. However, a defendant’s status as a habitual violent felony offender does not necessarily carry with it the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence.
The trial court’s discretion to sentence a defendant as a habitual violent felony offender extends to its decision on whether to impose a mandatory minimum term. See State v. Hudson, 698 So. 2d 831 (Fla.1997). Therefore, the court’s pronouncement of his sentence did not automatically indicate the imposition of a mandatory minimum term.
The defendant’s claim, although improperly labeled as a 3.800 motion, was facially sufficient and cognizable under rule 3.850. The trial court had the discretion to consider it under that rule. DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Accordingly, we reverse the order of denial and remand the case for further consideration of the motion as if filed pursuant to rule 3.850.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WARNER, STEVENSON and MAY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2007)…. 2d at 886. However, in Covell v. State, 891 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), the Fourth District affirmed a trial court’s denial of an appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion without prejudice to file a rule 3.850 motion. Similarly, in Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the Fourth District chose to treat a rule 3.800 motion as a rule 3.850 motion and held such motion met the requirements for stating a claim under rule 3.850. Oral Pronouncement of Sentence This Court has held that a court’s or…
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England v. State, 879 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…te, 841 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that written sentence that provided for probation consecutive to jail time and varied from oral pronouncement that jail time be a condition of probation was illegal sentence). But see Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (finding that discrepancy between written and oral sentence is not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion). . The trial court agreed with England that another condition of probation regarding restitution had to be struck and that…
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Riviere v. State, 965 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…nd otherwise met the requirements of rule 3.850, the postconviction court should not have denied it but rather should have treated it as a motion filed pursuant to that rule. See Snell v. State, 890 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court’s order and remand for reconsideration pursuant to rule 3.850. If the court again denies the motion, it shall attach portions of the record that conclusively refute Riviere’s clai…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Hudson, 698 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1997)
- Campbell v. State, 718 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- DeSANTIS v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- TIG Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 707 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Gardner v. State, 707 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Broomfield v. State, 698 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Singletary v. Owens, 698 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)