KEVIN O'NEILL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2003-12-12
No. 2D03-2312
Fulmer, J., Davis, J., Wallace, J.
861 So. 2d 1234 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appellate court reversed denial of jail credit motion where trial court failed to address defendant's claim for 220 days county jail credit, requiring reconsideration on remand.


Holding

A trial court must address a defendant's claim for jail credit and provide rationale if denying it, rather than summarily denying the motion without explanation.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court denying a defendant's claim for jail credit must set forth its rationale and attach relevant record portions that refute the claim, rather than summarily de…

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Facts & Procedural History

Kevin O'Neill sought correction of his sentence, claiming entitlement to 312 days of jail credit consisting of 92 days at a restitution center and 220…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Kevin O’Neill appeals the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in which he claimed that the trial court erred by awarding him only 203 days of jail credit. We reverse and remand for further consideration.

O’Neill alleged that he is entitled to 312 days of credit which he calculated by adding 92 days served at a restitution center and 220 days served in the county jail. In its order denying O’Neill’s motion, the trial court correctly concluded that O’Neill is not entitled to credit for the 92 days he served in a restitution center. See Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Turner v. State, 395 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, the trial court failed to address O’Neill’s claim that he served 220 days in the county jail. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider O’Neill’s claim for jail credit. See Crawford v. State, 823 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). If the trial court determines that summary denial is proper, it must set forth its rationale and attach any relevant portions of the record that refute O’Neill’s claim.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

FULMER, DAVIS, and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Connell L. Carroll v. State, 914 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
    …tion of the sentence. It failed to address Carroll’s claim that he was entitled to time served in county jail as a condition of his probation. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider Carroll’s motion. See O’Neill v. State, 861 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). If the trial court determines that summary denial is appropriate, it must set forth its rationale and attach any portions of the record that conclusively refute Carroll’s claim. Reversed and remánded. WHATLEY, CASANUEVA, and…
  • Gentes v. State, 878 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    …, 29 Fla. L. Weekly S230, — So. 2d -, 2004 WL 1064790 (Fla. May 13, 2004); Murray v. Regier, 872 So. 2d 217 (Fla.2002). However, we certify as a question of great public importance the same question certified by our sister courts in Freeze v. State, 861 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Gray v. State, 854 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003): MAY AN INDIVIDUAL BE COMMITTED UNDER THE JIMMY RYCE ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT THE STATE MUST PROVE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN CONTROL…
  • In re Commitment OF Moses Higdon. Moses Higdon v. State, 884 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …onal control, as required by Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), we certify the same question certified as one of great public importance in Lee v. State, 854 So. 2d 709, 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Freeze v. State, 861 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003): MAY AN INDIVIDUAL BE COMMITTED UNDER THE JIMMY RYCE ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT THE STATE MUST PROVE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING HIS OR HER DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR? Affirmed; qu…

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