STEPHEN SELF, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Stephen Self was convicted of a second DUI offense within three years and received a mandatory minimum jail sentence. Self sought credit against this sentence for time served in a voluntary alcohol rehabilitation program. The court held that credit for time served can only be applied to actual incarceration in jails or prisons, not to time spent in rehabilitation facilities, and denied Self's petition for certiorari.
A defendant may not receive credit for time served in an alcohol rehabilitation facility against a mandatory jail sentence. Credit for time served is limited to actual incarceration in jails or prisons and cannot be applied to time spent in other institutions such as drug rehabilitation centers, halfway houses, or probation centers.
[1] A defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, facing a mandatory jail sentence for a repeat offense, is not entitled to credit against that sentence fo…
[2] Statutory provisions mandating imprisonment for repeat DUI offenders cannot be circumvented by trial courts allowing credit for time served in rehabilitation facilities.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute specifically provides that the court shall order imprisonment for repeat DUI offenders. This provision is mandatory and cannot be undercut by the trial court.”
Establishes that the DUI sentencing requirement is mandatory and trial courts lack discretion to circumvent it
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStephen Self was convicted in county court of driving under the influence of alcohol. This was Self's second DUI conviction within three years, trigge…
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PER CURIAM.
Stephen Self petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review an appellate decision of the circuit court in and for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. The question presented is whether a defendant facing a mandatory jail sentence may receive credit against that sentence for time served in a voluntary alcoholic rehabilitation program. We find that the circuit court was correct in disapproving such credit and deny the petition for certiorari.
Self was convicted in county court of driving under the influence of alcohol. Because the conviction was Self’s second within three years, the county court was required to sentence him to at least ten days in jail. § 316.193(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1985). Prior to sentencing, Self had committed himself to a twenty-eight-day alcohol treatment program, and the court agreed to allow credit for this amount of time. On appeal, the circuit court held that treatment at an alcohol abuse facility is not “incarceration” as required by the statute.
The statute specifically provides that the court shall order imprisonment for repeat DUI offenders. This provision is mandatory and cannot be undercut by the trial court. Van Buren v. State, 500 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Muoio, 438 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). While anyone sentenced to a term of imprisonment is entitled to “credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence,” section 921.161(1) Florida Statutes (1985), that provision, like section 316.193(4)(b), is limited to actual incarceration and has been held inapplicable to such institutions as drug rehabilitation centers, Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla.1981), halfway houses, Anderson v. State, 449 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), and probation and restitution centers, Turner v. State, 395 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Self attempts to distinguish Pennington, Anderson, and Turner as holding only that a court is not required to allow such credit. However, as did the supreme court in Pennington, we rely on the plain language of the statute. We, accordingly, hold that credit for time served in institutions other than jails or prisons is unauthorized under section 316.193(4)(b).
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Smith v. State, 619 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…to “credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence,” § 921.161(1), Fla.Stat. (1991), he will get no credit for time served in drug rehabilitation centers, halfway houses, and probation and restitution centers. Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla.2d DCA 1987) (and cases cited therein). A defendant will, however, be given credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a jail, where the detention “constitute[s] a coercive deprivation of liberty and…
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O'Neill v. State, 861 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…d at a restitution center and 220 days served in the county jail. In its order denying O’Neill’s motion, the trial court correctly concluded that O’Neill is not entitled to credit for the 92 days he served in a restitution center. See Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Turner v. State, 395 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, the trial court failed to address O’Neill’s claim that he served 220 days in the county jail. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider O’Nei…
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Rivera v. State, 878 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…court properly denied his motion for additional credit for time served. See Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla.1981). See also Toney v. State, 817 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Taylor v. State, 726 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Doretha Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Muoio, 438 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- VAN Buren v. State, 500 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Curtis v. Evans, 395 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Elliott Keith Anderson v. State, 449 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)