JOSEPH JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for cocaine trafficking because the sentencing statute was unconstitutional under the single subject requirement and could not be retroactively applied to offenses committed during the "Taylor window."
A minimum mandatory sentencing provision for cocaine trafficking cannot be retroactively applied to offenses committed during the period when the statute was unconstitutional under the single subject requirement.
[1] A minimum mandatory sentencing provision declared unconstitutional under the single subject requirement cannot be retroactively applied to offenses committed during the p…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoseph Jones was convicted of trafficking in cocaine for an offense committed on February 19, 2001, and sentenced to a three-year minimum mandatory se…
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FULMER, Judge.
Joseph Jones appeals a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for trafficking in cocaine under section 893.135(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), for an offense committed on February 19, 2001. The minimum mandatory sentencing provision was added by chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, which this court declared unconstitutional as a violation of the single subject requirement. See Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 821 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2002) (table decision). This court has also held that the subsequent reenactments of these provisions cannot be retroactively applied without violating the Ex Post Facto Clauses in the United States and Florida Constitutions. Green v. State, 839 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), review granted by State v. Franklin, Nos. SC03-413 & SC03-532 (Fla. Sept. 19, 2003). Because the offense date falls within the Taylor window, see Green, 839 So. 2d at 750 n. 1, we reverse the minimum mandatory sentence. We also certify that Taylor and Green conflict with State v. Franklin, 836 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), review granted, Nos. SC03-413 & SC03-532, 854 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Sept. 19, 2003).
Sentence reversed; remanded for resentencing; conflicts certified.
WHATLEY and COVINGTON, JJ„ Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Carnes v. T.D. Fender, 936 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…hould not have been granted. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE The events precipitating the underlying suit on appeal have previously been reviewed by this Court. See Great Harbour Cay Realty & Inv. Co. v. Carnes, 862 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The first suit was based on the Carneses’ claim against Great Harbour Cay Realty & Investment Company (“Great Harbour”) for non-payment under an employment contract.1 The Carneses ultimately prevailed with a jury verdict awardin…
Authorities Cited
- Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Gende v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Families, 836 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Green v. State, 839 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)