KEVIN COLEMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Kevin Coleman, convicted of first-degree murder in 1992, appealed the trial court's denial of both a motion to recuse and a Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief motion. The appellate court reversed, finding the motion to recuse was legally sufficient because the trial judge had improperly communicated with media about the pending case, requiring recusal and remand to a successor judge.
The motion to recuse was legally sufficient and should have been granted because the alleged facts—that the judge discussed the pending case with media and showed reporters a draft order—would cause a reasonably prudent person to fear inability to receive a fair and impartial decision. As a result, the order denying the Rule 3.850 motion was a nullity and must be vacated for reconsideration by a successor judge.
[1] A motion to recuse must be granted if it is legally sufficient, meaning it meets technical requirements and the alleged facts would prompt a reasonably prudent person to…
[2] A motion to recuse is legally sufficient when it is in writing, alleges specific facts and reasons for disqualification, includes sworn affidavits, and is timely filed.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If a motion to recuse is technically sufficient, and the facts alleged therein also 'would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial from the judge,' the motion is legally sufficient and should be granted.”
Establishes the legal standard for granting a motion to recuse—technical sufficiency plus facts that would cause reasonable fear of unfairness.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColeman was convicted of first-degree murder in 1992 and sentenced to life with a 25-year minimum mandatory. In March 2001, he filed a Rule 3.850 moti…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion For Recusal cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Kevin Coleman was convicted of first-degree murder in 1992, and is serving a life sentence with a minimum mandatory of twenty-five years. In March 2001, Coleman filed a second Rule 3.850 motion seeking post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. While this motion was being considered by the trial court, a motion to recuse was filed by Coleman.
The trial court denied both motions in simultaneous filings in December 2002. The denials of these motions are addressed in this appeal. Because the motion to recuse should have been granted, we reverse the denial of the motion to recuse as well as the denial of the Rule 3.850 motion.
A motion to recuse must be granted by the trial court if it is legally sufficient. For a motion to recuse to be legally sufficient, it must meet technical requirements that it be in writing, “allege the facts and reasons relied on to show the grounds for disqualification,” include sworn affidavits by the party and attorney filing the motion, and be filed by the tenth day following discovery of the information providing grounds for recusal. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160; Carrow v. The Fla. Bar, 848 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). One of the grounds on which a motion to recuse can be based is “that a party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(d)(1). If a motion to recuse is technically sufficient, and the facts alleged therein also “would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial from the judge,” the motion is legally sufficient and should be granted. Nunez v. Backman, 645 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In such a circumstance, the facts alleged are to be taken as true and their veracity should not be considered by the judge. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Penland, 668 So. 2d 200, 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
Coleman timely filed a motion to recuse in writing, including the required sworn statements. Coleman’s alleged ground for recusal was that the trial judge had engaged in interviews with Palm Beach Post reporters prior to actually ruling on the Rule 3.850 motion, and informed those reporters of his impending decision while showing them a draft of the order. Coleman alleged that this conduct violated Canon 3(B)(7) of the Rules of Judicial Conduct, prohibiting the consideration of communications about pending cases occurring outside the presence of the parties. Based on this conduct, Coleman stated a fear that he could not receive a fair decision from a judge who considers media opinion and reaction during a case.
Reviewing the motion to recuse as described, Coleman met the technical requirements of legal sufficiency set out in Rule 2.160. We conclude that a reason ably prudent person taking the allegations as true could fear that by discussing the case with the media, the ability of the trial judge to provide Coleman with a fair and impartial decision on the Rule 3.850 motion was compromised. See Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Carnoto, 840 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001); In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F. 3d 164 (1st Cir.2001). Therefore, the motion to recuse was legally sufficient and should have been granted.
Because the motion to recuse should have been granted, the order denying the Rule 3.850 motion must also be vacated because it was entered after the motion to recuse was filed. See Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.2000) (ruling on motion to dismiss while motion to recuse was pending violated Florida Statutes section 38.10 and Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(f) prohibiting further proceedings and requiring immediate ruling on recusal); Rogers v. State, 341 So. 2d 196, 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (order entered after recusal is a nullity). As a result, this case is remanded for a successor judge to consider the Rule 3.850 motion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GUNTHER, WARNER and MAY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Andrzej Madura and Anna Dolinska-Madura v. Turosienski, 901 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…v. State, 866 So. 2d 165, 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he or she could not get a fair and impartial trial from the judge. Thus the motion to disqualify should have been granted. See Coleman v. State, 866 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Mr. Turosienski argues that the trial judge was permitted to pass upon the underlying facts in the motion pursuant to .rule 2.160(g) because the trial'judge was acting as a successor judge. Indeed, a prior judge had issued…
Authorities Cited
- Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2000)
- Rogers v. State, 341 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Demello Bolware v. State, 668 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Penland, 668 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Carrow v. THE Florida BAR, 848 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Berger v. Balcor Payroll Co., Inc., 645 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Betancourt v. State, 840 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)