STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANK MITCHELL, APPELLEE
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The court held that the Jimmy Ryce Act does not require the current incarceration to be for a sexually violent offense for commitment proceedings to apply.
The state sought to commit an individual as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act. The individual had completed his sentence for a prio…
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PER CURIAM.
The state filed an amended civil complaint against Appellee, seeking to commit him to state custody as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act. Ap-pellee moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Ryce Act did not apply because he had completed his sentence for the sexually violent crime in 1991 and his current incarceration was not for a sexually violent crime. The trial judge issued an order granting Appellee’s motion and dismissing the petition. We reverse, but certify the question as one of great public importance.
Appellee was convicted in 1983 of a sexually violent offense, as defined in section 394.912(9), Florida Statutes, and completed his sentence in November 1991. At the time the state attorney filed the Ryce Act petition against Appellee, he was under a Department of Corrections sentence for possession of cocaine and felonious possession of a concealed weapon. In his motion to dismiss the petition, Appellee asserted the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to commit him under the Ryce Act because his current incarceration was not for a sexually violent crime. He argued that a strict construction of section 394.925, Florida Statutes, allowed commitment of only those individuals who are in the custody of the Department of Corrections and serving a sentence for a sexually violent offense at the time the petition is filed. We agree with the decision in Tabor v. State, 864 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), that Appellee’s argument is refuted by sections 394.913(1), 394.912(9)(g), and 394.912(11), Florida Statutes. We therefore reverse1 but certify this question as one of great public importance:
DOES THE RYCE ACT REQUIRE THAT THE CURRENT INCARCERATION BE FOR A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE?
ERVIN, BARFIELD, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. . We express no opinion on the affirmative defense which was raised by Appellee below but not addressed by the trial judge.
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Mitchell v. State, 911 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2005)…y serving sentences for sexually violent offenses, but could also be applied to those, like Mitchell, whose current prison sentences were for non-sexually -related crimes, but who had been previously convicted of a sexual offense. State v. Mitchell, 866 So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), review denied, No. SC04-368, 907 So. 2d 1171, 2005 WL 1699507 (Fla. July 6, 2005). Mitchell sought review of that decision in this Court and we stayed the review proceedings pending resolution of the same issue in Hale v. S…
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State v. Sawyer, 870 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…the state alleges, he “suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long term control, care and treatment.” Bound by State v. Mitchell, 866 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), we reverse and, as in Mitchell, certify this question as one of great public importance: [*958] DOES THE [JIMMY] RYCE ACT REQUIRE THAT THE CURRENT INCARCERATION BE FOR A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE? BARFIELD, DAVIS, and BENTON, JJ…
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Burton v. State, 876 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. State v. Mitchell, 866 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Tabor v. State, 864 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). We certify the same question as one of great public importance: DOES THE RYCE ACT REQUIRE THAT THE CURRENT INCARCERATION BE FOR A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE? WOLF, C.J., ERV…
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- Barber v. State, 864 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)