R.S., THE MOTHER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, APPELLEE
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The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed in part a trial court's termination of parental rights, holding that the court erred by terminating parental rights on a statutory ground (39.806(1)(d)1.) that was not pleaded in the termination petition, thereby denying the mother procedural due process. However, the court affirmed the termination overall because another properly pleaded ground (39.806(1)(e)) independently supported termination.
The court held that the trial court erred by terminating parental rights on an unpleaded ground, as this constituted a denial of procedural due process rights of notice and a fair hearing. The court reversed and remanded to remove all findings and references to 39.806(1)(d)1., but affirmed the termination because the properly pleaded ground of 39.806(1)(e) independently supported termination.
[1] A trial court may not terminate parental rights on a ground not pleaded in the termination petition.
[2] Termination of parental rights requires adequate notice and a meaningful hearing.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“R.S. was unaware that her parental rights were subject to termination at the hearing on the ground not pleaded, and consequently, she was unprepared to rebut the ground, especially where the ground was not even mentioned until the trial court's ruling.”
Demonstrates the due process violation: the mother lacked notice and opportunity to prepare a defense on the unpleaded ground.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Department of Children and Families filed a petition to terminate R.S.'s parental rights to her four children, alleging five statutory grounds for…
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GUNTHER, J.
The parental rights of R.S. were terminated. R.S. raises multiple issues on appeal. We write to address only the issue of whether the trial court erred by terminating R.S.’s parental rights on a ground not pleaded in the termination petition. On that issue, we reverse.
The Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to R.S. and her four children. In the petition, DCF stated five grounds for termination: Florida Statutes sections 39.806(l)(b), 39.806(l)(c), 39.806(l)(d)3., 39.806(l)(e), and 39.806(1)®. During DCF’s opening statement at the termination hearing, DCF requested termination on three grounds: 39.806(l)(b), 39.806(l)(b)3. [presumably 39.806(l)(d)3.], and 39.806(l)(e).
At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court made findings supporting termination under 39.806(l)(d)l. and 39.806(l)(e). In the written order of termination, the trial court indicated that it was terminating R.S.’s parental rights under 39.806(l)(d) and 39.806(l)(e), incorporating findings relevant to both 39.806(l)(d)l. and 39.806(l)(d)3., as well as 39.806(l)(e).
R.S. contends that it was error for the trial court to terminate her parental rights on a ground, 39.806(l)(d)l., not pleaded in the termination petition. See In the Interest of A.D.J., 466 So. 2d 1156, 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)(recognizing the principle in the conteict of permanent commitment). We agree. The termination petition does not allege 39.806(l)(d)l. as a ground for termination, nor did DCF seek termination under this ground during its opening statement or by amendment of the petition. Additionally, the termination was not tried by consent. Nonetheless, the trial court terminated R.S.’s parental rights on this ground. This fact is not altered by the termination order’s focus on 39.806(l)(d) as a whole where the un-pleaded ground of 39.806(l)(d)l. was considered and incorporated by the trial court. Such is error because it is a denial of the procedural due process rights of notice and a fair hearing. See Wood v. State, 544 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla.1989)(“adequate notice and meaningful hearing” required before termination of substantive rights). R.S. was unaware that her parental rights were subject to termination at the hearing on the ground not pleaded, and consequently, she was unprepared to rebut the ground, especially where the ground was not even mentioned until the trial court’s ruling.
Therefore, on this issue, we reverse and remand for the entry of a termination order removing all findings and references relevant to 39.801(d)l. However, because another ground, 39.806(l)(e), supports termination, the ultimate outcome of this case is not impacted by the need to correct this error. We find none of the other issues raised by R.S. to be persuasive. As such, we affirm on all other grounds not addressed in this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
FARMER, C.J., and HAZOURI, J., concur.
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J.E., Sr. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 126 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…2003)). Moreover, so long as the trial court’s ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, is supported by [*428] the evidence, the court’s decision is affirm-able. See R.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 872 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that the ultimate outcome is not impacted by reversal on one ground when another ground supports termination). In this opinion, we discuss two of those statutory bases. The Father abandoned the Child With referenc…
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In the Interest of D.J. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. & Guardian Ad Litem Program, 9 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…, it is error for the trial court to declare a child dependent based on grounds not alleged in the Department’s petition. See, e.g., K.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 940 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); R.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 872 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). However, when the issue is tried by implied consent, these due process concerns are alleviated. See, e.g., W.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 961 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); K.S., 940 So. 2d at 578. Implied co…
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T.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 905 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…evidence of abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b),1 DCF concedes that the father’s parental rights cannot be terminated on this ground because it was not alleged as a ground for termination in the petition. See R.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 872 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The father’s attorney objected to termination on this ground at trial. Therefore, the issue was not tried by implied consent. And, while the father did not appear at trial, this cannot be viewed as consent to termination be…
Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wood v. State, 544 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1989)
- In the Interest of A.D.J. and D.L.J, 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)