THE J.M. SMUCKER CO., PETITIONER,
v.
GLEN RUDGE, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, RESPONDENTS; THE J.M. SMUCKER CO., V. DEBRA FRENKEL, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, RESPONDENTS; THE J.M. SMUCKER CO., V. ANN HART BERNING, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, RESPONDENT
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J.M. Smucker Co. sought a stay of three consolidated Florida class action lawsuits alleging fraud regarding its Simply 100% Fruit products, pending resolution of a substantially identical national class action filed in Illinois. The Florida appellate court granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the stay, finding the cases duplicative and that comity principles favored staying the Florida proceedings.
The court held that the Florida actions are substantially identical to the Illinois case in allegations and causes of action, and that all three Florida cases should be stayed pending resolution of the national class action in Illinois state court. The court rejected the argument that Smucker's contesting class certification in Illinois precluded it from seeking a stay, and found that failure to stay would subject Smucker to duplication of efforts, costs, and risk of inconsistent judgments.
[1] Principles of comity among sovereigns suggest that a court should stay proceedings in a duplicative action pending the resolution of a previously filed, substantially ide…
[2] A court may stay proceedings in a Florida action when substantially identical class action lawsuits have been previously filed in another state court.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The issue in this case is whether the Florida actions are so similar in parties and issues as to be unnecessarily duplicative of the previously filed Illinois state proceeding. If so, principles of comity among sovereigns suggest that this court should stay the proceedings in these cases pending the resolution of the Illinois case.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining whether a stay is appropriate based on comity principles
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 16, 2003, a class action was filed in Cook County, Illinois alleging that Smucker's Simply 100% Fruit products do not contain 100% fruit as lab…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, J.M. Smucker Co. (“Smucker”), seeks certiorari review of an order denying its motion to stay proceedings in these three consolidated Florida putative class actions pending the resolution of a substantially identical purported national class action in Illinois state court. We have jurisdiction, see Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(2) and REWJB Gas Investments v. Land O’Sun Realty Ltd., 645 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), rev. denied, 654 So. 2d 919 (Fla.1995), and quash the order of the trial court.
On May 16, 2003, Sari Smith filed a class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Smith v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 03CH08522, (the “Illinois case”) on behalf of “[a]ll purchasers in the United States of America of spreadable fruit products labeled Simply 100% Fruit manufactured, produced, and sold by J.M. Smucker Co. excluding its directors, officers and employees” for consumer fraud, deceptive business practices, unjust enrichment, and breach of warranty, alleging that Smucker’s Simply 100% Fruit products do not contain 100% fruit. Within a few months thereafter, three additional purported class action lawsuits were filed by the respondents herein, each seeking to certify classes of Florida purchasers of Smucker’s Simply 100% Fruit products and making the same operative allegations.1 The Illinois case is being vigorously litigated, and a resolution of the class certification issue is anticipated in the near future.
The issue in this case is whether the Florida actions are so similar in parties and issues as to be unnecessarily duplica-tive of the previously filed Illinois state proceeding. If so, principles of comity among sovereigns suggest that this court should stay the proceedings in these cases pending the resolution of the Illinois case. Polaris Public Income Funds v. Einhorn, 625 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (citing Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 417 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. dismissed, 427 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1983)). “This principle holds true whether the action was earlier filed in a state or federal court.” Polaris Public Income Funds v. Einhom, 625 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (citing Ricigliano v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 585 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)).
In this case, all of the Florida lawsuits contain the same basic allegations as the pre-existing Illinois case. The issues of law and fact are identical in all three Florida cases: (a) whether Defendant’s spreadable fruit products labeled Simply 100% Fruit contain less than 100 percent fruit; (b) whether Defendant misrepresented and/or omitted information about its spreadable fruit products labeled Simply 100% Fruit; and (c) whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched to the detriment of Plaintiff and the class.
We find that the allegations and causes of action in the Florida cases are substantially identical to the allegations made in the Illinois case, and that all three Florida cases should be stayed pending the resolution of the national class action pending in Illinois state court. In so doing, we reject respondents’ argument that Smucker’s contesting of the class certification in Illinois precludes it from seeking a stay of the Florida actions. To hold otherwise would obligate Smucker’s to stand mute on national class issue in order to obtain temporary relief here. We also reject respondents’ contention that Smucker’s will not be irreparably harmed.
The lower court’s failure to stay the Florida case subjects Smucker’s to duplication of efforts and costs, as well as the possibility of inconsistent judgments.
Based on the foregoing we conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in denying relief to Smucker’s on its Motion to Stay. See Sabol v. Bennett, 672 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). As such, we grant the petition for certiorari, quash the non-final order of the trial court, and remand with instructions to grant the requested stay.
. Eighteen other similar state court class actions have been filed in eleven states.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Inphynet Contracting Servs., Inc. v. R.V. Matthews III, 196 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…that when there is a previously-filed class action case which involves substantially similar parties and issues, the subsequently-filed action should be stayed. See Beckford v. GMC, 919 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); J.M. Smucker Co. v. Rudge, 877 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Einhorn, 625 So. 2d at 129-30. The record in this case does not reveal a valid reason to depart from the principle of priority. Because, as discussed above, the failure to observe the principle of priority is an abuse of di…
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Opko Health, Inc. v. Lipsius, 279 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)…ere jurisdiction attached in a concurrent jurisdiction involving substantially similar parties and issues, subjecting Petitioner to “duplication of efforts and costs, as well as the possibility of inconsistent judgments.” J.M. Smucker Co. v. Rudge, 877 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); see Pilevsky, 961 So. 2d at 1035 (“Resolution in the New York action of whether Morgans breached the management contract . . . [and] whether Morgans acted to the Shore Club’s detriment in dealing with its vendors will resolv…
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Opko Health, Inc. v. Alexander (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)…ere jurisdiction attached in a concurrent jurisdiction involving substantially similar parties and issues, subjecting Petitioner to “duplication of efforts and costs, as well as the possibility of inconsistent judgments.” J.M. Smucker Co. v. Rudge, 877 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); see Pilevsky, 961 So. 2d at 1035 (“Resolution in the New York action of whether Morgans breached the management contract . . . [and] whether Morgans acted to the Shore Club’s detriment in dealing with its vendors will resolv…
Authorities Cited
- Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 417 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Rewjb GAS Invs. v. Land O'Sun Realty, Ltd., 645 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Dusan Sabol, M.D. v. Bennett, 672 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Ricigliano v. Peat, 585 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- State v. Thompson, 625 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)