SUZANNE DEERE, APPELLANT,
v.
SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD AND INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATORS, INC., APPELLEES
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Suzanne Deere sought workers' compensation benefits for a workplace back injury, but the workers' compensation carrier denied her petition as untimely under the statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed, holding that the carrier may be estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense if Deere can prove the carrier misled her about her rights, and the trial court failed to consider her estoppel argument.
The workers' compensation carrier may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the carrier misrepresented a material fact; (2) the claimant relied on the misrepresentation; and (3) the claimant changed her position to her detriment. The trial court erred by failing to consider the claimant's facially sufficient estoppel allegations.
[1] A workers' compensation claimant may demonstrate estoppel against an employer/carrier's statute of limitations defense by showing that the employer/carrier misrepresented…
[2] An employer/carrier may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense if they mislead a claimant about their rights or the availability of workers' compensati…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where an E/C misleads a claimant about his or her rights or availability of workers' compensation, even unintentionally, resulting in the claimant's failure to file a timely claim, the E/C will be estopped from denying benefits.”
Establishes the primary legal principle that an employer/carrier can be estopped from asserting statute of limitations when it has misled the claimant about their rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeere injured her lower back at work on October 27, 1999, while working as a pre-kindergarten aide. She was authorized for treatment with three doctor…
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BROWNING, J.
We reverse the order denying workers’ compensation benefits on the ground that the statute of limitations had run because the JCC did not consider Appellant’s estoppel argument.
Appellant was at work as a pre-kinder-garten aide on October 27, 1999, when she tripped over toys and hurt her lower back. She made a timely application for workers’ compensation and was authorized for treatment with at least three doctors. The three found her to have reached maximum medical improvement by April 26, 2000.
On June 1, 2000, Appellant was involved in a car accident.
In January 2001, she visited one of her previously authorized doctors to find out whether her compensable injury had been aggravated by the car accident; the doctor refused to examine her because she had been in a subsequent intervening accident. Thereafter, Appellant allegedly called senior claims adjuster Marjorie Lane and spoke to Lane or her nurse; when Appellant asked what to do next, she was told “there is nothing we can do now.”
On October 4, 2002, Appellant filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits; the employer/earrier (E/C) put forth a statute of limitations defense in denying authorization. On November 8, 2002, Appellant filed a second petition for benefits; the record does not contain a response to this second petition. After a hearing, the JCC denied benefits on the ground that Appellant’s petitions were barred by the expiration of the time set forth in the statute of limitations. Appellant is entitled to reversal and remand because the JCC failed to address her argument that the E/C was estopped from denying benefits on that basis because of its advice to her that “there is nothing we can do now.”
Appellant’s petition was untimely under ' section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2002), because her claim was made more than two years after her injury and more than one year after her last receipt of benefits.
However, section 440.19(4) provides that an E/C may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense. Because the E/C complied with the notice requirements of sections 440.185 and 440.055, Florida Statutes, Appellant can demonstrate estoppel only by proof that is clear and convincing. See § 440.19(4); Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). To demonstrate estoppel, Appellant must show that (1) the E/C misrepresented a material fact; (2) Appellant relied on the misrepresentation; and (3) Appellant changed her position to her detriment because of the misrepresentation. See Regency Elec. Co. v. Honrath, 673 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Appellant’s allegations of estoppel are facially sufficient and should have been considered by the JCC.
Where an E/C misleads a claimant about his or her rights or availability of workers’ compensation, even unintentionally, resulting in the claimant’s failure to file a timely claim, the E/C will be estopped from denying benefits. Raymond v. Rapid Express Parcel Delivery of Tampa, 548 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Because the JCC failed to consider whether Appellant demonstrated estoppel, we REVERSE the denial of the petition for benefits and REMAND for the JCC to make such a determination.
BENTON and POLSTON, JJ. concur.
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Roberson v. ST. Johns Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Specialty Risk Servs., Inc., 973 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…ecause Claimant showed by clear and convincing evidence that E/C misrepresented a material fact, Claimant relied on the misrepresentation, and, as a result, Claimant changed position to her detriment. See generally Deere v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 880 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). E/C notified Claimant of her doctor’s zero percent permanent impair [*600] ment rating, but failed to correct or change the rating to ten percent upon receipt of that information. Claimant relied on the misrepresentation because…
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Deere v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Integrated Administrators, 911 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…PER CURIAM. In an earlier appeal, this court remanded this case for the JCC to consider whether appellant demonstrated estoppel. See Deere v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 880 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Appellant had the burden to make this showing. See id. at 826. The JCC found that appellant did not change her position to her detriment based on the E/C’s misrepresentation. Because this finding is supported by the record, we A…
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City OF Dania Beach & PGCS v. Zipoli, 204 So. 3d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…and that [the] claimant was misled to her detriment due to the E/C’s omission.” 38 So. 3d at 225. Thus, in that case, the elements of estoppel—detrimental reliance on a party’s misrepresentation—were established. See Deere v. Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 880 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“To demonstrate estoppel, Appellant must show that (1) the E/C misrepresented a material fact; (2) Appellant relied on the misrepresentation; and (3) Appellant changed her position to her detriment because of the misreprese…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. OF Broward Cnty. & Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Raymond v. Rapid Express Parcel Delivery OF Tampa & Claims Ctr., 548 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Regency Elec. Co. & CNA Ins. Co. v. Honrath, 673 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)