CLARENCE PETERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Peterson challenged an order striking his pro se motion to withdraw his no contest plea on drug and tampering charges. The trial court dismissed the motion based on a rule prohibiting hybrid representation, but the appellate court reversed, holding that an exception exists when a defendant claims his attorney coerced him into the plea, and remanded for proper consideration of the merits.
A defendant is not constitutionally entitled to hybrid representation, but an exception exists where the defendant claims his counsel coerced him into entering a plea. The trial court must consider the merits of such a claim rather than dismiss it on the hybrid representation ground alone.
[1] A defendant represented by counsel is generally not entitled to hybrid representation, appearing both pro se and through counsel.
[2] An exception to the prohibition against hybrid representation exists when a defendant alleges that their counsel coerced them into entering a plea.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is, however, an exception to this rule where a defendant claims that his counsel coerced him into entering a plea.”
Establishes the key exception to the no-hybrid-representation rule that the trial court failed to consider.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePeterson entered an open plea of no contest to possession of cocaine and tampering with evidence and was sentenced to concurrent three-year prison ter…
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STONE, J.
We reverse an order striking Peterson’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea.
Peterson entered an open plea of no contest on charges of possession of cocaine and tampering with evidence. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent three-year prison terms on each count. Two weeks later, Peterson filed a pro se motion to change his plea, alleging that he was coerced into pleading no contest. The court entered an order striking the pro se motion because Peterson was represented by counsel and not entitled to “hybrid” representation, citing State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla.1980); Salser v. State, 582 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); and Sheppard v. State, 391 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The trial court correctly recognized these cases as holding that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a “hybrid” form of representation, where he is represented by counsel and, at the same time, representing himself. There is, however, an exception to this rule where a defendant claims that his counsel coerced him into entering a plea. See, e.g., Cadet v. State, 795 So. 2d 228, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
We recognize that Peterson’s argument to this court is not coercion, but that his attorney misadvised him. Similarly, we recognize that the transcript of the change of plea hearing and his -written plea agreement set out the maximum sentence Peterson could receive. Further, the record indicates that Peterson was not threatened nor was he promised anything for entering into the plea.
Still further, we acknowledge that at Peterson’s sentencing, while defense counsel suggested house arrest so Peterson could continue working, the state recommended three-year prison terms. At no time did either party mention an agreement between Peterson and the state.
Nevertheless, the trial court did not deny Peterson’s motion on such record grounds. Instead, without reaching or considering the merits of Peterson’s motion, the trial court denied the motion solely on the ground that Peterson could not avail himself of “hybrid representation.”
Therefore, without reaching the merits, we reverse and remand for further consideration by the trial court. If the court does not conclude that the record conclusively rebuts Peterson’s allegations, then conflict-free counsel should be appointed with respect to his claim that his plea was coerced. See generally Snodgrass v. State, 837 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)(holding that the trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the record conclusively shows that the defendant is not entitled to relief).
GUNTHER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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Sheppard v. State, 17 So. 3d 275 (Fla. 2009)…ision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Sheppard v. State, 988 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), in which the Second District certified express and direct conflict with the decisions from the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Peterson v. State, 881 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), and Bermudez v. State, 901 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The conflict issue in this case is whether a trial court must strike as a nullity a defendant’s pro se motion t…
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Bermudez v. State, 901 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…A 2004). In Mourra the second district held that pleadings filed by a defendant who is represented by counsel are a nullity unless they include some unequivocal request to discharge counsel. Id. at 321. However, in our decision in Peterson v. State, 881 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), this court held that there is an exception to this rule when the defendant claims his counsel coerced him into entering the plea. Id. In Peterson, the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that he was co…
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Sheppard v. State, 988 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…and precluded the striking of his pro se motion as a nullity even though the motion did not contain an unequivocal request to discharge counsel. In support of his position, Mr. Sheppard relies on the Fourth District’s decisions in Peterson v. State, 881 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), and Bermudez v. State, 901 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th. DCA 2005). . Both of these decisions from the Fourth District— like this court’s decision in Mourra — address pro se rule 3.170G) motions that were filed by defendants with counse…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1980)
- Verdell Hill, Jr. v. State, 391 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Snodgrass v. State, 837 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Salser v. State, 582 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Cadet v. State, 795 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)