UNIMED, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. (PLIC), ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed an order that required insurance companies to cease business in Florida. The court found the order lacked sufficient factual basis to demonstrate an immediate danger to the public, which is required for such an order.
No, an order to cease and desist must contain a factual recitation demonstrating an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare, not merely allege a statutory violation or imply danger from being unlicensed.
[1] An immediate final order issued pursuant to section 120.569(2)(n), Florida Statutes, must contain a factual recitation demonstrating the existence of an immediate danger…
[2] Conclusory allegations implying a statutory violation are insufficient to support an immediate final order under section 120.569(2)(n).
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The order lacks a factual recitation demonstrating the existence of “an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare,” as required by section 120.569(2)(n).”
Establishes the primary deficiency in the lower court's order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants sought review of an order from the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) to cease and desist from transacting insurance business in Florida.…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants seek review of an Immediate Final Order entered by appellee (the Office of Insurance Regulation) pursuant to section 120.569(2)(n), Florida Statutes (2002), ordering appellants to cease and desist from the transaction of any new or renewal insurance business in Florida. The order lacks a factual recitation demonstrating the existence of “an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare,” as required by section 120.569(2)(n).
It is, instead, predicated solely on conclu-sory allegations implying that appellants’ failure to be licensed in Florida, by itself, constitutes an immediate danger to the public health, safety and welfare. The order is substantively indistinguishable from those held to be deficient by this court in Commercial Consultants Corp. v. Department of Business Regulation, 363 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), American Insurance Association v. Florida Department of Insurance, 646 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), Crudele v. Nelson, 698 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), Florida Association of Health Maintenance Organizations v. State Department of Insurance, 771 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and United Insurance Company of America v. State Department of Insurance, 793 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
As all of those decisions emphasize, it is not sufficient merely to allege a statutory violation; instead, the order must contain a factual recitation sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an imminent threat of “specific incidents of irreparable harm to the public interest” requiring use of the extraordinary device afforded by section 120.569(2)(n).
Commercial Consultants, 363 So. 2d at 1164. Accord United Ins. Co. of Am., 793 So. 2d at 1184 (quoting from Commercial Consultants).
Because the Immediate Final Order does not recite facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of “an immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare” as required by section 120.569(2)(n), we reverse.
REVERSED.
WEBSTER, BENTON and PADOVANO, JJ„ concur.
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Sherif Kodsy v. Dep't OF Fin. Servs. of the State of Fla., 972 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…onstrate the existence of an imminent threat of ‘specific incidents of irreparable harm to the public interest’ requiring use of the extraordinary device afforded by section 120.569(2)(n).” UNIMED, Prof l Lioh. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Office of Ins. Reg., 884 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Past acts may be sufficient to allege a danger of future misconduct if the conduct alleged is sufficiently serious and is likely to be repeated. Witmer, 631 So. 2d at 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Stock v. Dep’t of Banking & Fin…
Authorities Cited
- Commercial Consultants Corp. & Linene Woods, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 363 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Crudele v. Nelson, 698 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Fla. Dep't OF Ins. & Fla. Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 646 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- United Ins. Co. OF Am. v. State, 793 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Fla. Ass'n OF Health Maint. Orgs. & Fla. Ass'n of Managed Care Orgs. v. State, 771 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)