JOSE CORREA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2004-10-15
No. 2D03-1933
ALTENBERND, C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., concur.
892 So. 2d 1067 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

Jose Correa appealed his 15-year sentence for burglary and grand theft, arguing the trial judge imposed a vindictively increased sentence after he rejected the judge's private plea offer of 12 years because he wanted to preserve his appellate rights. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing by a different judge, finding a presumption of judicial vindictiveness that the State failed to rebut.


Holding

The court held that all factors giving rise to a presumption of vindictiveness were present in the record, and the State failed to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, Correa is entitled to resentencing by a different judge.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge's participation in plea negotiations requires strict adherence to procedural safeguards, including not initiating dialogue, not stating or implying alternat…

[2] When a trial judge participates in unsuccessful plea negotiations, a totality of the circumstances review determines if an increased sentence violates due process, consid…

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Key Quotes

“When a trial judge participates in plea negotiations which are ultimately unsuccessful, a totality of the circumstances review is appropriate to determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to due process was violated by the imposition of an increased sentence.”

Establishes the legal standard for reviewing claims of judicial vindictiveness in failed plea negotiations

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Facts & Procedural History

Correa pleaded no contest to burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. After the judge found the original 25-year sentence was based on an incorrect cri…

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Opinion of the Court
KELLY, Judge.

KELLY, Judge.

Jose Correa appeals from his sentence for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. We find merit only in his argument that the judge’s decision to sentence him to fifteen years after he rejected the judge’s plea offer of twelve years raised a presumption of judicial vindictiveness that the State failed to overcome. We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing.

Correa entered a plea of no contest to the charges of burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years in state prison for the burglary and five years for the grand theft. Correa filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 requesting to withdraw his plea and to have his sentence vacated. The judge found that the sentencing court had based its twenty-five-year sentence on an incorrect account of Correa’s criminal history and agreed that Correa was entitled to resentencing.

The judge called a recess during the proceedings and asked the prosecutor and defense counsel to meet him in his chambers. During the recess, the judge offered to resentence Correa to twelve years if everyone agreed to the amount of time and Correa waived his right to appeal. This meeting was not recorded. When the proceedings continued on the record, the judge asked defense counsel whether he talked to Correa and whether he had a proposal. Defense counsel stated that Correa declined the deal because he wished to preserve his right to appeal. Thereafter, the judge sentenced Correa to fifteen years.

In State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507, 513-14 (Fla.2000), the supreme court set forth certain procedural safeguards that must be met when a judge participates in plea negotiations: (1) the trial court must not initiate the plea dialogue; (2) the court cannot state or imply alternative sentencing possibilities which hinge upon future procedural choices; and (3) a record must be made of all plea negotiations involving the trial judge. See Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142 (Fla.2003) (emphasizing that the requirements of Warner must be strictly followed). None of these requirements were met in this case.

When a trial judge participates in plea negotiations which are ultimately unsuccessful, a totality of the circumstances review is appropriate to determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to due process was violated by the imposition of an increased sentence. Wilson, 845 So. 2d at 156. Factors to be considered in determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the harsher sentence was imposed in retaliation for the defendant exercising his or her right to proceed to trial include: (1) whether the trial judge initiated the plea negotiations; (2) whether the trial judge appears through comments on the record to have departed from his or her role as an impartial arbiter by urging the defendant to accept a plea, or by implying that the sentence imposed would hinge on future procedural choices; (3) the disparity between the plea offer and the sentence imposed; and (4) the lack of any facts on the record that would account for the increased sentence. Id. The appearance of some or all of these factors would give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. The State may overcome the presumption by presenting facts on the record which would explain the increased sentence, other than that the defendant chose to exercise his rights. Id.

All of the above factors appear in this record. The trial judge initiated the plea negotiations, indicated that the sentence would hinge on the defendant’s relinquish ment of the right to appeal, imposed a fifteen-year sentence rather than the twelve that was originally offered in chambers, and failed to give any explanation on the record for the increased sentence imposed after the plea negotiations failed. Based upon these facts, we conclude that a presumption of vindictiveness arose that was unrebutted. Accordingly, Correa is entitled to be resentenced by a different judge on remand. Id. at 159; Harris v. State, 845 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

ALTENBERND, C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Harris v. State, 903 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
    …its original offer on the record is a violation of State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla.2000), wherein the supreme court specifically stated that “[a] record must be made of all plea discussions involving the court.” Id. at 514. See Correa v. State, 892 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The State argues that any error was invited because it was only at defense counsel’s insistence that the court made a record of the plea offer. In fact, the record shows that the trial court was reluctant to do so. However, as t…
  • Drinmard Fudge v. State, 45 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
    …ld that this fact pattern amounts to vindictive sentencing. “A defendant’s refusal to waive his/her right to appeal is not a valid reason to impose a greater sentence.” Naim v. State, 837 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); see also Correa v. State, 892 So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Here, the trial court vigorously advocated the State’s plea offer. There is a very large disparity between the twenty-five year sentence offered and the life sentence imposed. The sentence hinged on a procedural choice:…
  • Tubbs v. State, 229 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
    …harsher sentence if he did not accept the plea at that time.”). Cf. Fudge v. State, 45 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (finding a sentence vindictive where it was increased because the defendant refused to waive his right to appeal); Correa v. State, 892 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (same). When a trial court' rules on a motion to withdraw plea it may only deny a legally sufficient motion without a hearing if the motion is conclusively refuted by the record. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 885 So. 2d 449, 452 (Fl…

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