REBECCA GALANTE AND CHRISTOPHER GALANTE, APPELLANTS,
v.
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2005-02-23
No. 4D03-3816
POLEN and MAY, JJ., concur.
895 So. 2d 1189 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2005) Caution
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

The Galantes sued their insurer USAA for bad faith after recovering a judgment exceeding their policy limits from an underinsured motorist. The trial court dismissed the bad faith claim because USAA paid the full contractual policy amount within 60 days of receiving the statutory notice required by Florida's bad faith statute, triggering the statutory safe harbor provision.


Holding

The court held that the 60-day notice requirement is not delayed by the pendency of underlying litigation, and an insurer that pays the full contractual amount due within 60 days of receiving statutory notice receives safe harbor protection under section 624.155(1)(d), barring any bad faith action.


Headnotes

[1] A first-party bad faith claim under section 624.155, Florida Statutes, does not accrue until the conclusion of the underlying litigation.

[2] The sixty-day notice period in a first-party bad faith claim under section 624.155, Florida Statutes, is a cure period designed to encourage payment of the underlying cla…

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Key Quotes

“No action shall lie if, within 60 days after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected.”

Statement of the statutory safe harbor provision that protected USAA from bad faith liability

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Facts & Procedural History

Rebecca Galante was severely injured in an August 1994 automobile accident caused by an underinsured motorist. USAA provided the Galantes with motor v…

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Opinion of the Court
GOLD, MARC H., Associate Judge.

GOLD, MARC H., Associate Judge.

Background,

On August 9, 1994, appellant Rebecca Galante suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident caused by an underin-sured motorist. Appellee USAA provided motor vehicle insurance to the Galantes which included $100,000.00 in uninsured/underinsured benefits.

The appellants brought suit against the underinsured motorist and on February 4, 2002, the jury found for the appellants, awarding $1,098,950.00 to Mrs. Galante and $75,000.00 to Mr. Galante. Following this, the appellants brought a bad faith action against USAA under section 624.155, Florida Statutes (2002). Attached to the Galantes’ complaint was the required civil remedy notice, dated March 23, 2002. The trial court dismissed the action, with prejudice, relying on the undisputed compliance with the safe harbor provision of section 624.155(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), by USAA. Analysis

A motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. See Crocker v. Marks, 856 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Relying on Blanchard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 575 So. 2d 1289 (Fla.1991), the appellants point out that a first party bad faith claim under section 624.155 does not accrue until the conclusion of the underlying litigation.1 Given this, the appellants go on to argue that the 60-day notice requirement should not be filed until the underlying litigation has been resolved, at which time they should be entitled to recover more than their policy limit. We disagree.

Section 624.155(l)(d) states: “No action shall lie if, within 60 days after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected.” See § 624.155(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002). Significantly, “[t]he sixty-day window is designed to be a cure period that will encourage payment of the underlying claim, and avoid unnecessary bad faith litigation." Talat Enters., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 753 So. 2d 1278, 1282 (Fla.2000)(emphasis added). The cure in a first-party insurance claim is payment of the contractual amount due the insured. See id. at 1283.

Here, the insurer took advantage of the statutory cure provided by section 624.155(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2002). It paid the contractual amount due the insured within sixty days of receipt of the notice. The trial court therefore properly granted the motion to dismiss. To hold otherwise would render the purpose of the 60-day cure period of section 624.155 meaningless.

In accord with Talat, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

POLEN and MAY, JJ., concur. . We note "there is no statutory requirement which prevents the insured from sending the statutory notice before there is a determination of liability or damages.” Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 1270, 1275 (Fla.2000).


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  • Capaldi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 898 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Galante v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 895 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). WARNER, GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.…
  • Guetzloe v. Fla. Elections Comm'n, 927 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …y the evidence, and asserts that the commission erred in denying his petition for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. Willfulness is a question of fact, not law. See, e.g., Roche Sur. & Cas. Co. Inc., v. Dept. of Financial Serv. Off. of Ins. Reg., 895 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Here, the determination of willfulness was also based in part on a legal issue; the effect of Doe on the applicable statutes. Where there are questions of law and fact, an evidentiary hearing is required. E.g., Spuza v. Dep’t of…

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