TROY ARMSTRONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Troy Armstrong appeals his conviction and probation sentence for introducing a controlled substance into a county detention facility and driving with a suspended license. The appellate court affirmed the conviction but reversed and remanded portions of the sentence, striking certain probation conditions that were imposed without proper documentation, statutory findings, or oral pronouncement.
The court struck the substance abuse testing condition entirely because it was not orally pronounced. The court vacated the prosecution cost, investigative cost, and court facility fee conditions and remanded for possible reimposition only if the statutory requirements of Florida Statutes sections 938.27(1) and 939.18 could be satisfied.
[1] Costs of prosecution and investigative costs incurred by law enforcement agencies must be requested and documented by those agencies to be included in a criminal judgment…
[2] A trial court may not impose discretionary costs against a defendant without statutory authority or proper documentation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court's failure to orally pronounce condition 24 at sentencing requires us to strike the condition of payment for the drug tests and bar the reimposition after remand.”
Establishes the rule that probation conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing must be struck and cannot be reimposed.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArmstrong was convicted of introducing less than 20 grams of marijuana concealed in his shoe into a county detention facility and driving with a suspe…
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PER CURIAM.
Troy Armstrong appeals his conviction and sentence for introduction of a controlled substance (less than 20 grams of marijuana concealed in his shoe) into a county detention facility1 and driving with a suspended license.2 He received probation and as special conditions thereof, certain costs were imposed, some of which were neither documented nor requested by the State and some of which were imposed without the necessary finding of ability to pay. More specifically:
1. Condition 21 of the probation order assesses $260.00 for the cost of prosecution pursuant to section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2003). The State neither asked for this assessment nor presented proof of the expenditures.
2. Condition 22 of the probation order assesses $160.00 for investigative costs of the Flagler County Sheriffs Office without a request for or documentation to support the assessment.
3. Condition 23 of the probation order assesses a $150.00 court facility fee pursuant to section 939.18, Florida Statutes (2003), without complying with the statutory requirement of finding an ability to pay. 4. Condition 24 of the probation order requires payment of $30.00 for substance abuse testing as required by the Department of Correction. This condition was not orally pronounced and appeared for the first time in the written order imposing probation.
The court’s failure to orally pronounce condition 24 at sentencing requires us to strike the condition of payment for the drug tests and bar the reimposition after remand. See, e.g., Porchia v. State, 705 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), approved, 716 So. 2d 766 (Fla.1998); Harris v. State, 698 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). We also vacate the above-described conditions 21, 22 and 23, but remand for reimposition of the costs if the requirements of sections 938.27(1) and 939.18 can be met. See, e.g., Pagliuca v. State, 860 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Vidal v. State, 820 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
SAWAYA, C.J., PETERSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. . § 951.22, Fla. Stat. (2003).
. § 322.34, Fk. Stat. (2003).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Colon v. State, 905 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…e orally pronounced sentence was based on mistake. See Farber. (emphasis added) See also Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla.2003)(jeopardy attaches at conclusion of sentencing hearing at which sentencing is pronounced); Armstrong v. State, 896 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Rivera v. State, 862 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Therefore, Counts II, IV and V are statutorily required to be concurrent. Macon. Section 921.16 is inclusive, and it places the burden on the trial judge to sentence with certa…
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Gilchrist v. State, 938 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…has recommended the more appropriate remedy in this case, to reverse the imposition of prosecution and investigative costs and remand for the trial court to reimpose the costs if the requirements of section 938.27 can be met. See Armstrong v. State, 896 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (vacating the imposition of costs for investigation and prosecution and remanding for reimposition of the costs if the requirements of section 938.27(1) could be met). Furthermore, Gilchrist must be given notice and an oppor…
Authorities Cited
- Repoleon Porchia v. State, 705 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- State v. Repoleon Porchia, 716 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1998)
- Vidal v. State, 820 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Pagliuca v. State, 860 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Harris v. State, 698 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)