LUIS VIDAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Luis Vidal, a juvenile charged as an adult with burglary and grand theft, pleaded guilty after the trial court indicated it would sentence him as an adult. The appellate court affirmed his convictions and concurrent sentences but reversed the imposition of $150 in discretionary costs that were imposed without the statutorily required inquiry and oral pronouncement.
The court affirmed the convictions and concurrent sentences but reversed the imposition of $150 in discretionary costs under section 939.18 because they were imposed without the required specific oral pronouncement and statutory inquiry. On remand, the trial court may reimpose the cost if it complies with section 939.18.
[1] A trial court may, in its discretion, indicate whether it will sentence a juvenile defendant as an adult if the defendant pleads guilty.
[2] Discretionary costs imposed pursuant to section 939.18, Florida Statutes, require specific oral pronouncement and the statutorily required inquiry.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After careful review of the record, as directed by In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla.1991), we affirm the convictions and sentences, except for the imposition of $150 in costs pursuant to section 939.18, Florida Statutes (2000).”
Establishes the court's holding affirming convictions and sentences but reversing the discretionary costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVidal, a juvenile, was charged as an adult with two counts of burglary and two counts of grand theft. Before pleading, he asked if the trial court wou…
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PER CURIAM.
Luis Vidal, a juvenile, was charged as an adult with two counts of burglary and two counts of grand theft. In contemplating a plea to the charges, he inquired if the trial court would consider sentencing him as a juvenile. The trial court, in its discretion, indicated that it would sentence him as an adult if he pleaded. He nevertheless pleaded guilty to the charges and received a guidelines sentence of fifty-eight months for each count, to be served concurrently, with restitution and costs imposed. All but one of the several errors in the orders for restitution and costs were corrected via a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) proceeding before his counsel filed this appeal and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
After careful review of the record, as directed by In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla.1991), we affirm the convictions and sentences, except for the imposition of $150 in costs pursuant to section 939.18, Florida Statutes (2000). These are discretionary costs, Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), that were imposed without specific oral pronouncement or the statutorily required inquiry. As in Patterson v. State, 796 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), review denied, No. SC01-2256, 817 So. 2d 849 (Fla. April 4, 2002), we reverse this portion of the sentence and remand with instructions to strike this cost from the judgment. On remand, the trial court may again impose this cost after complying with section 939.18.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
WHATLEY, NORTHCUTT, and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Caton v. State, 862 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ke the $150 discretionary Court Facilities Fee in condition 22 because of the trial court’s failure to conduct the statutorily required inquiry. On remand, the trial court may impose this fee after compliance with section 939.18. See Vidal v. State, 820 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). We also strike condition 25 requiring Catón to pay $1 per month of probation to First Step, Inc., because the trial court provided no statutory reference for the imposition of this cost. On remand, the trial court may impose this…
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Armstrong v. State, 896 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…We also vacate the above-described conditions 21, 22 and 23, but remand for reimposition of the costs if the requirements of sections 938.27(1) and 939.18 can be met. See, e.g., Pagliuca v. State, 860 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Vidal v. State, 820 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. SAWAYA, C.J., PETERSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. . § 951.22, Fla. Stat. (2003). . § 322.34, Fk. Stat. (2003).…
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Bell v. State, 900 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…imposing it without determining Bell’s ability to pay. See § 939.18, Fla. Stat. (2001). On remand, the trial court may impose this cost after compliance with section 989.18. See Caton v. State, 862 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Vidal v. State, 820 So. 2d 408, 408-409 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Sentence vacated; remanded with directions. ALTENBERND, C.J., and KELLY, J., Concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- In re App. Court Response to Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1991)
- Patterson v. State, 796 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)