LIBBY M. ABASCAL, APPELLANT,
v.
SOUTH DADE REHAB ASSOCIATES LP AND FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, APPELLEES
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Libby Abascal appeals a decision disqualifying her from unemployment compensation benefits after she voluntarily resigned from her position as a medical coder. The court affirms the disqualification, holding that her resignation to avoid potential future loss of accrued leave time does not constitute good cause for voluntary departure under Florida unemployment law.
An employee's voluntary resignation motivated by speculation about potential future loss of benefits does not constitute good cause attributable to the employer under Florida's unemployment compensation statute. The disqualification from unemployment benefits is affirmed.
[1] An employee who voluntarily leaves employment to avoid potential future discharge and loss of accrued benefits does not establish good cause attributable to the employer…
[2] Unemployment compensation is intended to provide economic assistance to those unemployed through no fault of their own.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The declared public purpose of the unemployment compensation law is to provide economic assistance to those unemployed through no fault of their own.”
Establishes the foundational purpose of unemployment compensation law that underlies the statutory disqualification for voluntary departure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAbascal was employed as a medical coder at a physical rehabilitation center. In December 2003, her annual evaluation indicated she met overall expecta…
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WELLS, Judge.
Libby M. Abascal appeals from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Commission disqualifying her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Because Abascal voluntarily left her employment without good cause, we affirm.
Prior to her resignation, Ms. Abascal was employed by a physical rehabilitation center as a medical coder. In December 2003, Abascal received her annual evaluation. That evaluation stated that Abascal had met overall expectations but that she needed to improve in a number of areas. Consequently, Abascal was placed on a 90-day performance improvement plan and advised that if her performance did not improve within that time, she would be subject to discharge. Rather than risk discharge and loss of accrued leave time (which under company rules was forfeited upon termination), Abascal resigned and subsequently sought to obtain unemployment compensation benefits. Both the unemployment compensation referee and the UAC rejected her claim. We affirm.
The declared public purpose of the unemployment compensation law is to provide economic assistance to those unemployed through no fault of their own. § 443.031, Fla. Stat. (2003).
The statute therefore generally disqualifies those who voluntarily leave their employment. See § 443.101(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).
While the act does excuse from disqualification those employees who leave their jobs for good cause attributable to their employers, we agree with the Commission that Abascal’s decision to quit her job rather than face possible loss of accrued leave at some time in the future on as of yet unrealized circumstances does not come within that exception. See, e.g., Home Fuel Oil Co., Inc. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 494 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (rejecting the argument that an employer’s change in ownership provided claimant with good cause to quit, stating that the “statute protects employees of only those employers who wrongfully cause their employees to ‘voluntarily’ leave their employment”); Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Relations Comm’n, 277 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (“[t]o voluntarily leave employment for good cause, the cause must be one which would reasonably impel the average able-bodied qualified worker to give up his or her employment”); see also Frogge v. Davenport, 906 S.W. 2d 920, 924 (Tenn.App.1995) (individual’s “voluntary decision to quit [which] was motivated only by speculation that he would lose his job and his accumulated benefits” was not good cause to leave his employment).
We therefore affirm.
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Romula J. Alvarez v. Dep't OF Transp. & Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 902 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…rily quit her employment without good cause attributable to the employer, § 443.101(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004), the order below which therefore disqualified her from unemployment compensation benefits is affirmed. See Abascal v. S. Dade Rehab Assocs., 900 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).…
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Guillen v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Comm'n & Republic Servs. of Fla., 103 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…2d 997, 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Brown v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 633 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Ritenour v. Unemployment Ap [*209] peals Comm’n, 570 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990; see also Abascal v. South Dade Rehab Assoc. LP, 900 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[W]e agree with the Commission that Abascal’s decision to quit her job rather than face possible loss of accrued leave at some time in the future on as of yet unrealized circumstances does not come within [the good cause] e…
Authorities Cited
- Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Relations Comm'n, 277 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Home Fuel OIL Co. v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Irene F. Castle, 494 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)