LUIS MANUEL QUINTERO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Luis Quintero appeals the revocation of his probation and imposition of a 94-month prison sentence. The appellate court found that the trial court properly identified a violation of one probation condition but improperly found a violation of another condition lacking a specified completion deadline, requiring reversal and remand to determine whether probation should be revoked based solely on the proven violation.
The court held that the State proved a violation of Condition 9 (failure to comply with probation officer instructions) but failed to prove a violation of Condition 30 (domestic violence treatment) because the condition did not specify a deadline for completion beyond the initial 30-day evaluation period. Because the record does not establish that the trial court would have revoked probation based solely on the Condition 9 violation, the revocation order must be reversed and remanded.
[1] A willful and substantial violation of probation is not established by the failure to complete a counseling program if the probation condition does not specify a time for…
[2] Evidence of failure to report to a probation officer as instructed and to submit required logs constitutes a willful and substantial violation of a probation condition re…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“evidence of the failure to complete a counseling program is insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion”
Establishes the legal standard that probation conditions requiring treatment or counseling must specify a deadline for completion to support a violation finding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceQuintero was on probation subject to two relevant conditions: Condition 9 required compliance with all instructions from his probation officer, and Co…
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PER CURIAM.
Luis Quintero appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation and imposing a sentence of ninety-four months’ imprisonment. The trial court found that Quintero willfully and substantially violated two conditions' of his probation. We conclude that the State proved a violation of only one of the two conditions found by the trial court. Because we are unable to conclude that the trial court would have revoked Quintero’s probation based solely on the violation proven, we reverse.
Condition 9 of Quintero’s terms and conditions of probation required him,, in pertinent part, to comply with all instructions given to him by his probation officer. Competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Quintero violated condition 9 by failing to report to the probation office as instructed and by failing to submit some required driving logs. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Quintero willfully and substantially violated condition 9 of his probation.
With respect to the alleged violation of condition 30, we reach a contrary conclusion. Condition 30 of Quintero’s probation provided: ‘You must undergo a domestic violence evaluation W/I 30 days, and if treatment is deemed necessary, you must successfully complete the treatment and any aftercare.” Treatment was indicated for Quintero, and he was ordered to complete a domestic violence intervention program. In previous cases, this court has held that evidence of the failure to complete a counseling program is insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion. See Mitchell v. State, 871 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Butler v. State, 775 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
In this case, the domestic violence treatment condition did not specify a time period within which completion of the treatment was required.
Accordingly, the State did not prove a willful and substantial violation of condition 30.
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Quintero violated this condition. As this court has suggested on more than one occasion, “the better practice is for the sentencing court to specify all performance conditions, such as the number of opportunities and a time period for completion of specific probationary conditions.” Davis v. State, 862 So. 2d 931, 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (Casanueva, J., concurring); accord Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Oates v. State, 872 So. 2d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
We cannot determine from the transcript of the revocation hearing whether the trial court would have revoked Quinte-ro’s probation solely for his violations of condition 9. Therefore, we reverse the order of revocation and remand this case to the trial court for its determination of whether to revoke Quintero’s probation based solely on the violations of condition 9 and, if so, to enter an amended order of revocation in accordance with its determination.
Reversed and remanded.
STRINGER, DAVIS, and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2007)…ram must be completed. It is so ordered. LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ„ concur. . The Fifth District also certified conflict with several cases that did not involve a drug treatment program. See Quintero v. State, 902 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (domestic vio [*226] lence program); Lynom v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (sex offender probation); Dunkin v. State, 780 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (sex offender probation); Butler v. State, 775 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2…
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Lawson v. State, 941 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…State, 871 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (drug treatment condition). Lawson relies on other decisions that apply the same principles to treatment programs that were not imposed as conditions of drug or sex offender probation. See Quintero v. State, 902 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); O’Neal v. State, 801.So. 2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Dunkin v. State, 780 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Butler v. State, 775 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We are not bound by…
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Kanecia Campbell v. State, 939 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…. Courts have held that “evidence of the failure to complete a counseling program is insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of proba tion if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion.” Quintero v. State, 902 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). See also Yates v. State, 909 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153, 153-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); O’Neal v. State, 801 So. 2d 280, 280-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537, 538…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ricci M. Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Butler v. State, 775 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Mitchell v. State, 871 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Oates v. State, 872 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Sweat Transp., Inc. v. Mena, 862 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
- Davis v. State, 862 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)