ROY WILKERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Roy Wilkerson's probation was revoked after he was discharged from a required mental health treatment program twice for excessive absences. The appellate court reversed, holding that discharge from a treatment program without a specified completion deadline does not constitute a willful and substantial violation of probation when sufficient time remains to complete it during the probationary term.
Discharge from a required treatment program does not amount to a willful and substantial violation of probation when the probation order contains no specified completion deadline and sufficient time remains within the probationary period for the defendant to complete the program, absent evidence that the defendant was unwilling or unable to complete it.
[1] A probation violation is not willful and substantial when the probation order does not specify a time period for completion of a treatment program and sufficient time rem…
[2] Discharge from a required treatment program prior to completion does not constitute a willful and substantial violation of probation if the probation order lacks a specif…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if a defendant is discharged or terminated from a required treatment program prior to its completion, the discharge or termination does not amount to a willful and substantial violation of probation when the probation order does not require completion within a specified period of time and sufficient time remains for the defendant to complete the program”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that absence of a specified deadline protects defendants from revocation based on program discharge alone
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 28, 2002, Wilkerson was placed on 36 months' probation for burglary of a dwelling. Probation condition 18 required him to undergo mental h…
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SILBERMAN, Judge.
Roy Wilkerson appeals the judgment and sentence entered following the revocation of his probation. Because the State failed to prove a willful and substantial violation of Wilkerson’s probation, we reverse.
On February 28, 2002, Wilkerson was placed on thirty-six months’ probation for burglary of a dwelling. Probationary condition 18 provided: ‘You must undergo a mental health evaluation, and if treatment is deemed necessary you must successfully complete the treatment and any aftercare.” The order did not specify a time period for completion of this condition. Although Wilkerson underwent a mental health evaluation and began a treatment program, the trial court revoked Wilkerson’s probation after he was discharged from the program twice for excessive absences.
This court has consistently held that if a defendant is discharged or terminated from a required treatment program prior to its completion, the discharge or termi nation does not amount to a willful and substantial violation of probation when the probation order does not require completion within a specified period of time and sufficient time remains for the defendant to complete the program. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 862 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Lawson v. State, 845 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Lynom v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Although Wilkerson was twice discharged from his treatment program, the State did not establish that he was either unwilling or unable to complete the program during his probationary term. Because Wilkerson has the remainder of his probationary period to comply with condition 18, the State failed to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation. See Davis, 862 So. 2d 931.
We note Judge Casanueva’s recent observation that “the better practice is for the sentencing court to specify all performance conditions, such as the number of opportunities and a time period for completion of specific probationary conditions.” Id. at 935 (concurring opinion). If time limits are clearly established for the completion of treatment programs, defendants will know what is required of them to comply with their probationary conditions.
Because the State did not establish a willful and substantial violation of Wilkerson’s probation, we reverse the order revoking Wilkerson’s probation.
Reversed.
CASANUEVA and CANADY, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Yates v. State, 909 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…equired PAR program was not a willful and substantial violation of the community control order because the order did not require completion within a specified time and sufficient time remained for him to complete the program. See Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The trial court may revoke probation or community control only if the State proves by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant willfully and substantially violated a specific condition of the probation or community…
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Quintero v. State, 902 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ify all performance conditions, such as the number of opportunities and a time period for completion of specific probationary conditions.” Davis v. State, 862 So. 2d 931, 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (Casanueva, J., concurring); accord Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Oates v. State, 872 So. 2d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). We cannot determine from the transcript of the revocation hearing whether the trial court would have revoked Quinte-ro’s probation solely for his violations of condit…
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Kanecia Campbell v. State, 939 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…substantial violation of proba tion if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion.” Quintero v. State, 902 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). See also Yates v. State, 909 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153, 153-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); O’Neal v. State, 801 So. 2d 280, 280-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In Jones, the appellant was ordered as a condition of probation to “enter and successfully complete res…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lashon Grant v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Lynom v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Sweat Transp., Inc. v. Mena, 862 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
- Davis v. State, 862 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Lawson v. State, 845 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)