NATHANIEL BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Nathaniel Brown appeals the denial of his Rule 3.800 motion challenging his habitual offender sentence for a robbery conviction. The court affirms, holding that probation from a prior burglary conviction constitutes a qualifying "sentence" under Florida's habitual offender statute, and that Brown was legally sentenced as a habitual offender because he committed the robbery while on probation.
The court holds that probation constitutes a "sentence" for purposes of the habitual offender statute, and that a defendant can be sentenced as a habitual offender if the new felony was committed while on probation from a prior conviction, regardless of whether the probation was revoked after the new conviction.
[1] Probation constitutes a conviction and a sentence for the purposes of habitual offender sentencing enhancement statutes.
[2] A defendant may be sentenced as an habitual offender if the new felony offense was committed while the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other commitment imposed…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the original sentencing date controls. Following this understanding, Brown's probation in case number 96-2329 is a conviction for purposes of applying the habitual offender statute in force at the time.”
Establishes that the court's holding on what constitutes a qualifying "sentence" for habitual offender enhancement purposes.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was convicted of burglary of a dwelling in 1996 and placed on probation. While on probation, he committed a strong arm robbery in 1998 and was c…
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FLETCHER, Judge.
Nathaniel Brown appeals from the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. We affirm.
Brown was convicted of burglary of a dwelling in case number 96-2329, and was placed on probation. While on probation, Brown committed a new felony offense of strong arm robbery, case number 98-18042. He was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years as an habitual offender. Brown argues that his habitual offender sentence is illegal because his probation in case number 96-2329 cannot count as a qualified prior “sentence” for purposes of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1997).
As the trial judge correctly explained in her order denying relief, there is disagreement among the district courts in Florida regarding the date of conviction for purposes of habitual offender sentencing and the sequential sentencing requirement. See Prudent v. State, 898 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)(certifying conflict with Richardson v. State, 884 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) on this issue); State v. Del Castillo, 890 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(probation is a “conviction” and constitutes a “sentence” under the habitual offender enhancement statute). In accordance with Prudent and Del Castillo we hold that the original sentencing date controls. Following this understanding, Brown’s probation in case number 96-2329 is a conviction for purposes of applying the habitual offender statute in force at the time.
In any event, Brown was legally sentenced as an habitual offender because he committed the new felony offense while on probation. The statute clearly provides that one may be sentenced as an habitual offender if the defendant was serving a prison sentence “or other commitment” imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony. § 775.084(l)(a)2.a, Fla. Stat. (1997). It is of no consequence that his probation in 96-2329 was not revoked until after his conviction and sentence in the current case.
We find Brown’s remaining issue to be without merit and affirm in all respects the trial court’s order denying relief, and certify conflict with Richardson v. State, 884 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), appeal docketed, No. SC04-174 (Fla.2004).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Erick Richardson v. State, 884 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- State v. DEL Castillo, 890 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
- Prudent v. State, 898 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)