TIMOTHY HARWOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
YING LI, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of a former husband's petition to modify child support based on substantial time sharing with the minor child. The court held that section 61.30(11)(b), Florida Statutes, which mandates adjustment of child support when a non-custodial parent exercises visitation at least 40% of the year's overnights, applies retroactively as a remedial statute and must be applied even in cases where the original dissolution was filed before the statute's amendment.
The statute applies retroactively. The trial court erred in ruling that it could not, as a matter of law, retroactively apply section 61.30(11)(b). The statute is mandatory and applies to modification proceedings, and as a remedial law that further confirms rights already established in the original 1987 child support guidelines, it can be applied retroactively.
[1] A trial court errs in ruling that it cannot, as a matter of law, retroactively apply the statute mandating adjustment of child support when a child spends a substantial a…
[2] The statutory provision for adjusting child support based on substantial time sharing is mandatory and applies in both initial and modification proceedings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trier of fact shall order payment of child support which varies from the guideline amount as provided in paragraph (ll)(b) whenever any of the children are required by court order or mediation agreement to spend a substantial amount of time with the primary and secondary residential parents”
Establishes the mandatory nature of the child support adjustment requirement
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties last sought modification of child support in July 1999. The former husband filed a supplemental petition for modification based in part on…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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TAYLOR, J.
The former husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his supplemental petition for modification of child support. His petition was based in part on his substantial time sharing with the minor child. We reverse, because the trial court erred in ruling that it cannot, as a matter of law, retroactively apply section 61.30(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), which mandates adjusting a child support award when a child spends a substantial amount of time with each parent.
The parties last sought modification of child support in July 1999, before the amendments to section 61.30(ll)(b) created a procedure for factoring substantial time sharing into child support calculations. Section 61.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), provides:
The child support guideline amount as determined by this section presumptively establishes the amount the trier of fact shall order as child support in an initial proceeding for such support or in a proceeding for modification of an existing order for such support, whether the proceeding arises under this or another chapter. Notwithstanding the variance limitations of this section, the trier of fact shall order payment of child support which varies from the guideline amount as provided in paragraph (ll)(b) whenever any of the children are required by court order or mediation agreement to spend a substantial amount of time with the primary and secondary residential parents. This requirement applies to any living arrangement, whether temporary or permanent.
A “substantial amount of time” is defined in section 61.30(ll)(b)10 as an arrangement where the non-custodial parent exercises visitation at least 40 percent of the overnights of the year. Section 61.30(11) is mandatory and applies in both initial and modification proceedings for child support. See Seiberlich v. Wolf, 859 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that F.S. section 61.30(ll)(b) also applies to modification proceedings where initial agreed upon guidelines child support did not take into account a parent’s substantial time sharing with the minor child); Santiago v. Santiago, 830 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and finding an abuse of discretion where the trial court failed to reduce the former husband’s child support award even though he did not request it); Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that the statutory adjustment is mandatory); Migliore v. Harris, 848 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that the trial court was required to adjust the child support obligation under section 61.30(ll)(b)).
In this case the court determined that the child spends greater than 43% of the time with the father and acknowledged that such an amount of time is “substantial” under the statute mandating adjustment of child support. But the court erroneously ruled that it was precluded as a matter of law from applying section 61.30(ll)(b) to the former husband because he filed his petition for dissolution in July 1999, before the effective date of the enactment.
We have previously held that section 61.30(ll)(b) and its amendments can be applied retroactively because they are remedial laws that do not create new rights or liabilities but further or confirm rights already established by section 61.30 in 1987, when the guidelines were first enacted. See Arze v. Sadough-Arze, 789 So. 2d 1141, 1144-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Guttler v. Guttler, 798 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Undercuffler v. Undercuffler, 798 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and Remanded.
STEVENSON, C.J., and HAZOURI, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Nadrich v. Nadrich, 936 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…tial amount of time with each parent, the court shall adjust any award of child support” accordingly. Contrary to the wife’s argument here and at trial, this court has held that the adjustment is mandatory, not discretionary. See Harwood v. Ying Li, 909 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Migliore v. Harris, 848 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)(holding that the trial court was required to adjust the child support obligation under section 61.30(11)(b)); Santia [*19] go v. Santiago, 830 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA…
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Rodriguez v. Medero, 17 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…(b), Florida Statutes (2007), mandates a reduction in child support whenever the noncustodial parent spends a "substantial amount of time” with the children, meaning more than forty percent of the overnights of the year. See also Harwood v. Ying Li, 909 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The parties in this case refer to this method of calculating child support as the "gross-up method.”…
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Edrulfo Antonio Largaespada v. Largaespada, 920 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…03), review dismissed, 846 So. 2d 1148 (Fla.2003); Jensen v. Jensen, 824 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), review denied, 842 So. 2d 844 (Fla.2003); see generally Buhler v. Buhler, 913 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) and cases cited; Harwood v. Ying Li 909 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Santiago v. Santiago, 830 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We therefore reverse the order below and remand with directions to compute and effect the reduction. Reversed and remanded. .Section 61.30(ll)(b) provides Whenever a p…
Authorities Cited
- Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Undercuffler v. Undercuffler, 798 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Mauricio A. Arze v. Soheila Sadough-Arze, 789 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Migliore v. Harris, 848 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Seiberlich v. Wolf, 859 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Santiago v. Santiago, 830 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Guttler v. Dona Guttler, 798 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)