RICHARD F. SEIBERLICH, APPELLANT,
v.
SHERRY E. WOLF, F/K/A SHERRY E. SEIBERLICH, APPELLEE
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In this child support modification case, the trial court reduced the appellant's support obligation based on decreased income but denied a further reduction for substantial time-sharing with the child. The appellate court reversed, holding that once the court finds a change in circumstances warranting modification, it must apply the statutory child support guidelines, including mandatory reductions for substantial time-sharing arrangements.
Once a trial court finds an independent change in circumstances justifying modification of child support, it must apply the statutory child support guidelines, including the mandatory reduction for substantial time-sharing arrangements. A prior settlement agreement paying above guideline amounts does not preclude a parent from seeking modification based on changed circumstances and statutory requirements.
[1] Child support guidelines are presumptively applied in modification proceedings.
[2] A trial court may order child support that varies by more than five percent from the guideline amount only upon a written finding explaining why the guideline amount woul…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trier of fact shall order payment of child support which varies from the guideline amount as provided in paragraph (ll)(b) whenever any of the children are required by court order or mediation agreement to spend a substantial amount of time with the primary and secondary residential parents”
Establishes the mandatory nature of the time-sharing reduction under statutory guidelines
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties divorced in December 2000 with a settlement agreement providing the appellee primary residential responsibility and the appellant approxim…
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TORPY, J.
In this child support modification proceeding, Appellant sought a reduction in his support obligation based upon a reduction in his income and his having the child a “substantial amount of time” pursuant to a shared parental arrangement. The trial court granted the reduction based on Appellant’s income change but denied a further reduction due to the time sharing arrangement. Because the lower court based its decision to deny the further reduction on an incorrect legal premise, we reverse and remand this cause for further consideration.
In connection with their divorce proceeding, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in December of 2000, which was incorporated into a final judgment. Under the agreement, Appellee was given primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child, and Appellant was ordered to pay child support based upon the guidelines but without reduction due to substantial time sharing. Appellant was granted visitation amounting to slightly over 45% of the total overnights. In July of 2001, Appellant petitioned for a downward modification of his child support obligation alleging a substantial change in his circumstances and further requesting that the child support guidelines be followed. On January 13, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting a reduction in child support but rejecting Appellant’s argument that he was entitled to a further reduction based on the fact that he met the statutory definition of having the child a “substantial amount of time.” § 61.30(ll)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial court’s reasoning was that Appellant chose “to settle the issues of child support and visitation by settlement agreement rather than try those issues to the court.” Apparently, the lower court believed that Appellant’s agreement to pay more support than required by law precluded him from seeking a modification. Appellant timely appeals this order. The issues in this case are governed by section 61.30, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides in relevant part as follows:
61.30. Child support guidelines; retroactive child support
(l)(a) The child support guideline amount as determined by this section presumptively establishes the amount the trier of fact shall order as child support in an initial proceeding for such support or in a proceeding for modification of an existing order for such support, whether the proceeding arises under this or another chapter. The trier of fact may order payment of child support which varies, plus or minus 5 percent, from the guideline amount, after considering all relevant factors, including the needs of the child or children, age, station in life, standard of living, and the financial status and ability of each parent. The trier of fact may order payment of child support in an amount which varies more than 5 percent from such guideline amount only upon a written finding explaining why ordering payment of such guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate. Notwithstanding the variance limitations of this section, the trier of fact shall order payment of child support which varies from the guideline amount as provided in paragraph (ll)(b) whenever any of the children are required by court order or mediation agreement to spend a substantial amount of time with the primary and secondary residential parents. This requirement applies to any living arrangement, whether temporary or permanent.
§ 61.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied).
This section makes clear that the presumptive guideline amount must be applied in modification proceedings. Furthermore, the reduction in support due to substantial time sharing is mandatory. Migliore v. Harris, 848 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Santiago v. Santiago, 830 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). This case is unlike Knight v. Knight, 702 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and its progeny, which preclude downward modification of support when the only basis for finding a change of circumstances is that the guideline formula results in lower payments. Here, the court found an independent basis for its determination that the circumstances had changed. Therefore, at that point, the court was obligated to consider all statutory criteria in arriving at the appropriate support amount including the time sharing arrangements. See Niemann v. Anderson, 834 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SHARP, W., and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
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Buhler v. Buhler, 913 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…ation at least 40 percent of the overnights of the year.” See Guttler v. Guttler, 798 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Applying this provision is mandatory. Cheverie v. Cheverie, 898 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); see Seiberlich v. Wolf, 859 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Migliore v. Harris, 848 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Here, the visitation order reflects that the children will spend more than 40 percent of the overnights with the father.1 Consequently, the plain language of t…
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Nadrich v. Nadrich, 936 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…. 4th DCA 2002)(holdlng that the language of the statute is mandatory and finding an abuse of discretion where the trial court failed to reduce the former husband’s child support award even though he did not request it); see also Seiberlich v. Wolf, 859 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)(holding that section 61.30(ll)(b) also applies to modification proceedings where initially agreed upon guidelines child support did not take into account a parent’s substantial time sharing with the minor child); Keeley v. Keeley…
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Harwood v. LI, 909 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…an arrangement where the non-custodial parent exercises visitation at least 40 percent of the overnights of the year. Section 61.30(11) is mandatory and applies in both initial and modification proceedings for child support. See Seiberlich v. Wolf, 859 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that F.S. section 61.30(ll)(b) also applies to modification proceedings where initial agreed upon guidelines child support did not take into account a parent’s substantial time sharing with the minor child); Santiago v.…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Migliore v. Harris, 848 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Santiago v. Santiago, 830 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Boulware v. Coal. FOR THE Homeless OF Cent. Fla., 702 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Niemann v. Anderson, 834 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Knight v. Knight, 702 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)