ALEXANDER GALINDEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Galindez appeals his 2003 resentencing order, arguing that Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington require invalidation of guideline points for penetration assessed by the court rather than a jury. The court affirms, holding that Apprendi and Blakely have no retroactive application to convictions that became final before those decisions were announced, and applying them retroactively would effectively pardon the defendant.
The court rejects the argument that Apprendi and Blakely require invalidation of the penetration points. Because Apprendi and Blakely have no retroactive application and the conviction became final in 1998, those decisions cannot be applied to alter the effect of a jury verdict and conviction rendered prior to their announcement, even though resentencing proceedings occur afterwards.
[1] Blakely v. …
[2] Sentences imposed in 2005 for convictions that became final in 2001 are affirmed, even if they were imposed under a sentencing guidelines scheme that would violate Blakel…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Apprendi and Blakely, which have no retroactive application, see Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005), cannot be applied to alter the effect of a jury verdict and conviction — as well as, in this case, a direct appeal— rendered prior to those decisions, notwithstanding that further resentencing proceedings are pending afterwards.”
Establishes the core holding that Apprendi and Blakely lack retroactive application to convictions finalized before their announcement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGalindez was convicted in 1998 of multiple sexual offenses after a jury trial. His convictions and sentences were initially affirmed on direct appeal …
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SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
The defendant-appellant was convicted in 1998 of multiple sexual offenses after a jury trial. The convictions and sentences were affirmed in Galindez v. State, 728 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The defendant then moved for relief from the sentences under Rule 3.800, and appealed from its denial. In Galindez v. State, 831 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), rendered on January 13, 2003, we partially reversed and remanded on the ground that the trial court had overassessed the points for penetration in preparing the guideline scoresheet. The present appeal is from a resentencing order entered on November 21, 2003, in accordance with our mandate in that case. The primary issue is the claim that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and, more precisely, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), decided on June 24, 2004, require the invalidation of any points for penetration because they were assessed by the court, rather than by the jury.
We reject this contention because, as clearly and correctly stated by Judge Kahn in Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813, 815-16, 2005 WL 1467321 (Fla. 1st DCA Case no. 1D03-3438, opinion filed, June 23, 2005)(Kahn, J., dissenting), Apprendi and Blakely, which have no retroactive application, see Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837 (Fla.2005), cannot be applied to alter the effect of a jury verdict and conviction — as well as, in this case, a direct appeal— rendered prior to those decisions, notwithstanding that further resentencing proceedings are pending afterwards. Accord United States v. Price, 400 F. 3d 844 (10th Cir.2005), petition for cert. filed, — U.S.L.W. -, — U.S. -, — S.Ct. -, — L.Ed.2d - (U.S. May 31, 2005)(No. 04-10694); United States v. Sanders, 247 F. 3d 139 (4th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1032, 122 S.Ct. 573, 151 L.Ed.2d 445 (2001); see also Hughes, 901 So. 2d at 838 (Apprendi does not apply retroactively to convictions which were final when Apprendi was decided). Contra Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813, 2005 WL 1467321 (Fla. 1st DCA Case no. 1D03-3438, opinion filed, June 23, 2005). We are particularly persuaded by the following portion of Judge Kahn’s dissent:
[E]ven though appellant was resen-tenced in June 2001, Apprendi does not apply because his conviction became final in 1998. Apprendi, of course, involves a right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution for state criminal defendants to have certain facts determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a judge. As the Hughes retroactivity analysis instructs, the rule of Apprendi is not “of sufficient magnitude as to require retroactive application.” [901 So. 2d at 840]. Here, because Isaac’s jury was obviously discharged after the original criminal trial on January 15, 1997, the factual matters underlying the guidelines departure sentences may not be submitted to a jury. Accordingly, Hughes' focus on finality of the conviction is very important, and I would follow that rule until it is altered. Because these convictions were final long before announcement of the Ap-prendi rule, I would let the twenty-year sentences stand.
Isaac, 911 So. 2d at 816 (Kahn, J., dissenting). This observation’s application to this case was forcefully demonstrated when, at oral argument, defense counsel was asked whether, consistent with her position to apply Apprendi-Blakely retroactively, she would now waive any double jeopardy objection to retrying the issue of penetration to a jury. Her negative reply establishes that applying that doctrine to this case would amount simply to a pardon of the defendant for an act he confessed to committing because the rules of the game were deemed to have changed after it was over.1 We certify that this decision is in conflict with Isaac.
Affirmed, conflict certified.
. It is for this reason, also, that we disagree with the Isaac majority that the situation presents a manifest injustice precluding what might otherwise be required by the law of the case doctrine. See Swain v. State, 911 So. 2d 140, 2005 WL 1398472 (Fla. 3d DCA Case no. 3D05-1034, opinion filed, June 15, 2005); Hepburn v. State, 844 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), review denied, 851 So. 2d 729 (Fla.2003).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (24 total)
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Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2007)…g; they affect the conviction as well because the facts found at that time dictate the sentence. If that is the case, then applying Apprendi and Blakely to a resen-tencing would “alter the effect of a jury verdict and conviction.” Galindez v. State, 910 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Stated another way, if Apprendi and Blakely reverberate backward to the defendant’s conviction, applying those cases to defendants whose convictions already were final constitutes a retroactive application, contrary to our d…1 / 2
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State v. Fleming, 61 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2011)…of facts that are essential to the sentence imposed. We have for review Fleming v. State, — So. 3d-, 2006 WL 1041164, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified conflict with Galindez v. State, 910 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Following our disposition of Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla.2007), approving the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision on other grounds, we granted the State’s…
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Thomas v. State, 914 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…the trial court did not err in rejecting this claim. To the extent the majority opinion in Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), effectively applied Blakely retroactively, we certify conflict and align ourselves with Galindez v. State, 910 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), holding that Ap-prendi and Blakely did not apply retroactively to convictions that became final in 1999, even though resentencing took place in 2003 on a scoresheet error, post-Apprendi. Affirmed. STEVENSON, C.J., GUNTHER…
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004)
- Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2005)
- Lemuel E. Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- Swain v. State, 911 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- Galindez v. State, 831 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
- Gundlah v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Hepburn v. State, 844 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Clark v. United States, 534 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 2001)
- Ringer v. United States, 534 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 2001)