REGINALD PETERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Reginald Peterson was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and one count of use of a firearm during a felony. He was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) to life imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed the convictions but reversed the PRR sentence due to failure to properly authenticate the Department of Corrections records necessary to establish PRR status.
The court affirmed the convictions and rejected arguments that Apprendi and Blakely apply to PRR sentencing and that Crawford prohibits DOC business records. However, the court reversed the PRR sentence because the State failed to properly authenticate the DOC records establishing Peterson's prior release date, which is a requirement for PRR sentencing.
[1] Apprendi and Blakely do not apply to the determination of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes.
[2] Department of Corrections business records are not considered testimonial for purposes of Crawford v. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court, and not a jury, determined that the PRR requirements were met. This argument is without merit because the two cases do not apply to the fact of a prior conviction”
Establishes that Apprendi and Blakely do not apply to prior conviction findings in PRR sentencing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePeterson was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to two co…
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BROWNING, J.
Appellant Reginald Peterson was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) on the sexual battery counts, and to time served on the remaining count. Appellant now seeks review of the convictions and sentence, raising three arguments. For the reasons below, we hereby affirm Appellant’s convictions but reverse his sentence as a PRR. Appellant’s first argument is that the PRR sentence is illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2848, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), as modified by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), because the trial court, and not a jury, determined that the PRR requirements were met. This argument is without merit because the two cases do not apply to the fact of a prior conviction, as revealed in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, and in Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536, 124 S.Ct. 2531, and because Apprendi does not apply to PRR sentencing, as held in McDowell v. State, 789 So. 2d 956 (Fla.2001). Moreover, the Fourth District has specifically held that Apprendi and Blakely do not apply to the finding of a prior release date. See Gurley v. State, 906 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Appellant’s second argument is that admission of the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) records violated his rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). This argument is without merit because the DOC’s business records are not “testimonial,” as the term is used in Crawford. See Desue v. State, 908 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Appellant’s third argument, however, warrants reversal of the PRR sentence. Appellant argues that the DOC records were not authenticated, and he is correct. See Arnett v. State, 843 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The affidavit is not sufficient to authenticate the records either under the PRR statute or under the Florida Evidence Code’s provision for self-authenticating business records found in section 90.902(11), Florida Statutes. See Gray v. State, 910 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). While the State could have provided a live witness to authenticate these documents, the State chose not to do so, even though, inexplicably, the State presented such a witness to testify as to the victim’s prior release date (to support her story as to why she was walking home so late at night). Finally, the release date was not stipulated by the parties. Because the State failed to demonstrate Appellant’s PRR status, the PRR sentence cannot stand.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM Appellant’s convictions but REVERSE his sentence and REMAND for resentencing. On remand, the trial court may again sentence Appellant as a PRR if it makes the required findings and the evidence supports those findings. See Glover v. State, 871 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
KAHN, C.J., and LEWIS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…l hearsay and thus inadmissible in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Desue v. State, 908 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that Department of Corrections computer printouts are admissible to show a prisoner’s release date); Peterson v. State, 911 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that admission of Department of Corrections business records did not violate defendant’s Confrontation rights); Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (holding that admission of autopsy reports, without testi…
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Lenorris Parker v. State, 973 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…mitted. We also reject Mr. Parker’s argument that the evidence presented to establish his alleged release date from prison violated his right of confrontation set forth in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Peterson v. State, 911 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (Department of Corrections records were not testimonial, and thus admission of those records to determine defendant’s status as a prison re-leasee reoffender (PRR) for sentencing purposes did not violate his rights under Confront…
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Card v. State, 927 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…ade or kept for law enforcement or trial purposes.4 Thus, it clearly falls within the type of hearsay recognized in Crawford that is admissible in a criminal trial without implicating the defendant’s confrontation rights. See also Peterson v. State, 911 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that Department of Correction’s business records are not testimonial); Desue v. State, 908 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that computer printout, called a “Crime and Time Report,” was admissible under business…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004)
- Gray v. State, 910 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- Julian v. Desue, IV, 908 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- McDOWELL v. State, 789 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 2001)
- O'Donnell v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publ'g Corp., 906 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Glover v. State, 871 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Gurley v. State, 906 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Arnett v. State, 843 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)