DERRICK D. GURLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Derrick Gurley was convicted of burglary and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. He appealed, arguing that the trial judge—not a jury—determined he committed his current offense within three years of prison release, violating the Sixth Amendment under Blakely v. Washington. The court affirmed, holding that recidivist sentencing statutes fall outside Apprendi/Blakely protections.
The court held that Apprendi and Blakely do not apply to prison releasee reoffender sentences. The date of a defendant's release from prison under the prison releasee reoffender statute is analogous to a prior conviction under recidivist statutes, which fall outside the scope of Apprendi/Blakely protections. Therefore, a jury is not required to make this determination, and the sentence was proper.
[1] Facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender statute's factual predicate, concerning the timing of a prior release from prison, does not constitute an element of the charged offense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Statement of the rule from Apprendi v. New Jersey that requires jury determination of sentence-enhancing facts, establishing the baseline legal standard under discussion.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGurley was convicted by jury of burglary of an occupied dwelling. The trial court sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender under Florida Statute …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Apprendi V. New Jersey cases and more on FLexlaw
GROSS, J.
After a jury trial, appellant Derrick Gur-ley was convicted of burglary of an occupied dwelling. The trial court sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2004).
On appeal Gurley argues that his prison releasee reoffender sentence was improper under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), because it was a judge, and not a jury, who determined that his current conviction fell within three years of his release from prison.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the Supreme Court held that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The supreme court revisited Apprendi in Blakely and extended its application to sentencing guideline schemes which allow judges to sentence more severely based on facts that are a part of the criminal offense. For example, Blakely involved a defendant whose sentence was enhanced because he had acted with “deliberate cruelty” in committing the underlying crime.
Recidivist sentencing statutes based on a defendant’s prior criminal record fall outside of Apprendi and Blakely. The Florida Supreme Court has held that Apprendi does not apply to prison releasee reoffender sentences. See McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976 (Fla.2001). We have held that Apprendi does not apply to recidivism statutes, so that a jury is not required to find the existence of predicate convictions beyond a reasonable doubt before a habitual felony offender sentence may be imposed. See McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); see also Frumenti v. State, 885 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); United States v. Marseille, 377 F. 3d 1249, 1257 n. 14 (11th Cir.2004). For the purpose of applying Apprendi and Blakely, the date of a defendant’s release from prison under the prison releasee reoffender statute is analogous to the fact of a prior conviction under the habitual felony offender statute. For these reasons, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
STEVENSON, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Calloway v. State, 914 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ination. Id. at 634. Applying the rationale of Tillman, we conclude that Calloway’s date of release from prison is a part of his prior record and thus does not need to be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gurley v. State, 906 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“For the purpose of applying Apprendi and Blakely, the date of a defendant’s release from prison under the prison releasee reoffender statute is analogous to the fact of a prior conviction under the habitual felony offende…
-
Peterson v. State, 911 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…prendi does not apply to PRR sentencing, as held in McDowell v. State, 789 So. 2d 956 (Fla.2001). Moreover, the Fourth District has specifically held that Apprendi and Blakely do not apply to the finding of a prior release date. See Gurley v. State, 906 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Appellant’s second argument is that admission of the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) records violated his rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). This argument is without meri…
-
Acosta v. State, 956 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We affirm Acosta’s PRR sentence. See Yisrael v. State, 938 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Gurley v. State, 906 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), rev. denied, 915 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.2005). Affirmed. WARNER, KLEIN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004)
- McBRIDE v. State, 884 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- United States v. Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Frumenti v. State, 885 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- State v. Brooks, 789 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2001)
- McGREGOR v. State, 789 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2001)