KIMBERLY CLARIDY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kimberly Claridy appealed the summary denial of her post-conviction motion challenging the legality of her resentence. The court reversed because Florida law prohibits resentencing a defendant to more than 364 days' incarceration upon violation of probation following participation in a youthful offender boot camp.
A defendant may not be resentenced upon a subsequent violation of probation to a period exceeding 364 days' incarceration following participation in a youthful offender boot camp pursuant to Florida Statutes section 958.04(2)(b). Claridy's resentence to 10 years in prison violated this statute and was therefore illegal.
[1] A post-conviction motion is not the proper vehicle to challenge the legality of a sentence based on prior participation in a youthful offender boot camp.
[2] A defendant who has participated in a youthful offender boot camp may not be resentenced to a period exceeding 364 days' incarceration upon a subsequent violation of prob…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant may not be resentenced upon a subsequent violation of probation to a period exceeding 364 days' incarceration following participation in a youthful offender boot camp pursuant to section 958.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997).”
Establishes the core legal principle prohibiting resentencing beyond 364 days after boot camp participation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaridy participated in a youthful offender boot camp program, and as a result, the trial court modified her original sentence to 2 years and 10 month…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the summary denial of her post conviction motion, in which she asserted that her sentence is illegal as a matter of law because she had previously participated in a youthful offender boot camp, and because the trial court, upon appellant’s violation of probation, subsequently resentenced the appellant to a period of more than 364 days’ incarceration.
Although the appellant’s first claim is not cognizable in a rule 3.800 motion, we must reverse as to the second claim. A defendant may not be resentenced upon a subsequent violation of probation to a period exceeding 364 days’ incarceration following participation in a youthful offender boot camp pursuant to section 958.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997).
See Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Here, according to appellant’s motion and supporting documents, she participated in a youthful offender boot camp program and, as a result, the trial court modified her original sentence to 2 years and 10 months of probation. Then, upon the appellant’s subsequent violation of probation, she was resenteneed to a period of 10 years in prison followed by 10 years of probation.
Thus, the trial court’s imposition of a sentence exceeding 364 days’ incarceration, upon the appellant’s violation of probation, would violate section 958.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997) and appears illegal. See Thomas, 825 So. 2d at 1033; Bloodworth, 769 So. 2d at 1118. We, therefore, REVERSE the summary denial and REMAND for the trial court to either attach documentation conclusively refuting the appellant’s claim, or to grant the appellant the relief requested.
KAHN, C.J., WOLF and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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Adderly v. State, 958 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…6-270, Laws of Florida: Porter v. State, 940 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Eason v. State, 932 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Diaz v. State, 929 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Cutler v. State, 927 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Claridy v. State, 911 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Green v. State, 902 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Holmes v. State, 899 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Lee v. State, 884 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Mims v. State, 871 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Blaxton v. State, 868…
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Claridy v. State, 943 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…note that this Court had reversed the summary denial of the 3.800 motion and remanded “for the trial court to either attach documentation conclusively refuting the appellant’s claim, or to grant the appellant the relief requested.” Claridy v. State, 911 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Ultimately, the trial court held that because the 3.800 motion was still before the trial court, pursuant to the actions of this Court, this issue was not properly brought in a rule 3.850 motion. The trial court appears to hav…
Authorities Cited
- Baron Ellis Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)